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Abstract 
Currently, business requirements for rapid operational efficiency, customer 
responsiveness as well as rapid adaptability are driving the need for ever increasing 
communication and integration capabilities ofthe software assets. 
Functional decomposition into re-usable software entities, loose coupling, and 
distribution of resources are all perceived benefits of the investment on Service 
Oriented Architecture (SOA). This malleability can also bring about the risk of a more 
difficult oversight. The same service is ideally used in different applications and 
contexts. This situation forces a supporting infrastructure to allow and manage the 
adaptability to these different contexts of use. 
In this thesis, the author proposes to govern such variations in a cost efficient way by 
composing the core business function offered by a service with other services 
implementing infrastructure capabilities that fulfil varying non-functional 
requirements. 
However, as the number of services increases and their use in different contexts 
proliferates, it becomes necessary to automate policy enforcement and compliance 
monitoring. Furthermore, the composition of services into different business 
applications over a common infrastructure intensifies the need for end-to-end 
monitoring and analysis in order to assess the business performance impact. 
Managing the full life-cycle of service definition, deployment, exposure and operation 
requires management processes that take into account their composition with the 
infrastructure capabilities that take of non-functional requirements. In addition, 
policies may change during the life-time of a service. Policy updates may be the result 
of various reasons including business optimisation, of reaction to new business 
opportunities, of risk / threat mitigation, of operational emergencies, etc. It becomes 
therefore clear that a well-designed governance architecture is a prerequisite to 
implementing a SOA capable of dealing with a complex and dynamic environment. 
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1. Introduction 
The way enterprises conduct business today is changing greatly. The enterprise has 
become more pervasive with a mobile workforce, outsourced data centres, different 
engagements with customers and distributed sites [1]. In addition, companies seeking 
to optimise their processes across their supply chains are implementing integration 
strategies that include their customers and suppliers rather than looking inward. This 
increases the need for governing end-to-end transactions between business partners 
and the customer (B2B2C and B2B2G) [2]. 
As pervasive organisations connect their heterogeneous environments and systems, 
cross- and intra-enterprise compliance becomes more critical. The legal and 
regulatory frameworks become more complex and less forgiving. Companies have to 
comply with their own directives and regulations as well as comply with different 
legislations and regulations depending on the region of operation and the client or 
partner organisations' rules and legal constraints. IT use in the corporate environment, 
and in particular the governance of the IT infrastructure that enables business 
services, will need to provide means to measure and control compliance. 
Globalisation and agility of integration require more systems along with more 
partners and more constraints and produce more complex environments where 
decision making processes are equally increasingly complex and crucial for this 
connected organisation. Change in a single process has the potential to impact more 
than one partner and disrupt a wider range of business processes. 
It is important for any enterprise to understand how its business has performed at any 
given time in the past, present, and in the future. However, single partners no longer 
have a full visibility of all processes and their consequences. It becomes much harder 
for a single enterprise to therefore govern its collaboration with other enterprises in a 
safe and controlled way, to understand the use of its information and resources across 
the value chain, and to identify and assess the impact of violations of policies or 
agreements. There is a need for well-orchestrated, end-to-end operations management 
that provides controlled visibility, governance of network and IT state, timely 
assessment of the impact of security policy violations and the availability of 
resources. Hence, there is an increasing interest in Service Oriented Infrastructure 
(SOl) dashboards [3] showing real-time state of the corporate infrastructure including 
the B2B integration points. 
Finally, another consequence of these changes in the organisational environment is 
the emergence of the notion of Virtual Organisations (VO). These are defined in [4] 
as "temporary or permanent coalitions of individuals, groups, organisational units or 
entire organisations that pool resources, capabilities and information to achieve 
common objectives". According to this definition, VOs can provide services and thus 
participate as a single entity in the formation of further VOs, hence creating recursive 
structures with mUltiple layers of "virtual" value-adding service providers. The 
required scalability, responsiveness, and adaptability, requires a cost effective 
resource distribution management solution for dynamic VO environments. 
Effective solutions addressing these challenges require interdisciplinary approaches 
integrating tools from law, economics and business management in addition to 
distributed or "Cloud" computing. However, in this latter category, there are three 
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main aspects, as illustrated in Figure 1 to achieving effective governance in the 
context of high-value B2B interactions: 
1. Resource visibility - brings the best fit for purpose visibility into the IT 
infrastructure used and its state. This aims at making sure that not only it is 
possible to find the resource but also that its purpose and constraints are well 
understood. With complex systems comprised of many resources (e.g. Web 
service, policy) there is a strong requirement to increase the visibility of each 
resource. Indeed a same functionality could be provided by different services 
and advertised in different places. In addition, one of the strengths of SOA 
being reuse and composition, there is an obligation to know how resources 
communicate and are wired together. The relevant management of 
dependencies amongst resources is indeed a crucial element of the visibility. 
Furthermore, with a single resource involved in several collaborations or 
discussions it is necessary to keep track of how this same functionality is 
proposed (i.e. its attached constraints). Increasing the visibility includes 
advertising its functionality as well as Non Functional Properties (NFP) 
correctly and its issuer or provider. 
2. Policy administration and management - administers policies coming from 
different sources of authority and that may apply to different, potentially 
interrelated, contexts and business collaborations. In an organisation, the 
different levels of hierarchy manage their resources according to their 
responsibilities. As such managers set up rules on how certain requests from 
clients are going to be dealt with when the directors will set up the roles and 
limits of the manager's authority. As IT services attempt more and more to 
support business functions, the same types of policies should be applied to 
them, allowing for different levels of authority that apply in particular or more 
general cases. The same apply for the different areas of expertise where an 
account manager will dictate the pricing policy for a client and the lawyer will 
know how to write legal contracts. IT services are dependants of the IT 
specialists at different levels (e.g. deployment, security) as well as non-IT 
specialists. This aspect also deals with managing the selection and integration 
of the best policy decision and policy enforcement mechanisms to support the 
optimal use of IT resources and services in a given context and in compliance 
with corporate agreements. As introduced in the three points above, an SOA 
will suffer from having many services that may be available in different 
contexts and at different stages of their life-cycle. The management of the 
SOA is made through the use of policies and as such it is crucial to be able to 
manage how these are going to be used and enforced. In addition, such policy 
administration and management should allow detecting potential conflicts 
within the imbrications of services and their policies. 
3. Service provisioning - deals with the processes that allow organisations to 
effectively manage the exposure conditions of their services. This aspect of 
governance aims at both allowing an efficient contextualisation of the service 
interface provided to potential partners as well as supplying this 
contextualisation with the processes necessary to render its governance 
flexible. 
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In this thesis, the author aims to address the latter aspect of governance. The work 
presented in this thesis concerns the flexible management of services interactions 
where the properties of these exchanges are not a priori known. A related concern is 
that services should not suffer security and performance disadvantages as a result 
from exposing in this flexible manner. Thus governance can extend to supporting the 
safety of the interaction and scalability of the infrastructure supporting the exchanges. 
The main contributions of this work are the design and evaluation of a flexible 
middleware architecture supporting the governance of B2B interactions. The author 
designed this architecture to support two domains of action - design and run times -
that address requirements of the interactions management. The author shows how the 
middleware architecture can be implemented with a set of middleware services. The 
segregation of concerns proposed presents different advantages such as dynamic 
composition of the interaction contextualisation and systematic auditing. Additionally, 
this allows presenting an abstraction layer that is familiar from the enterprise context 
while providing regulated interactions in B2B context. For example, governed 
interactions can be used to secure exchanges in a more flexible manner than 
traditional approaches (c.f. section 2). 
In Section 1.1 of this chapter the author describes an example application that serves 
to motivate the work presented in this thesis and provide requirements for that work. 
Section 1.2 summarises the scope of the work. Finally, section 1.3 concludes the 
chapter with the assertion of thesis contributions and an overview of the remainder of 
the thesis. 
I I 
1.1. Example application 
This section describes a scenario that motivates the work in this thesis. This 
application is in part used to derive research challenges defined in section 1.2. In 
Chapter 4 , it also serves as proof-of-concepts for the implementation and discussion 
of the interaction governance middleware that address the challenges. 
The example application is a virtual music store. This music store is a public interface 
that aggregates and resells content and services from different specialised providers 
(e.g. Jazz or Classic music specialists). 
This example does not mean that the proposed approach is limited to this type of 
scenario. Indeed, a service oriented enterprise architecture with an environment of 
services providing functions (e.g. payroll, fleet management) would have also been a 
good motivation scenario. In the same manner, a service oriented e-health 
environment where devices, data and functions are available through network 
interfaces could have been used. Indeed, any scenario that would provide strong reuse 
and exposition flexibility requirements could have been presented. 
In the following text, the term profile is associated with a set of NFPs provided as a 
managed composition of services. 
1.1.1. Virtual music store scenario 
1.1.1.1 Description 
This section describes the virtual music store as an example of a Virtual Organisation 
(VO). According to [5], VOs are frequently restructured, sustained to capture the 
value of a market opportunity and dissolved again to give way for the creation of the 
next VO from within the network of independent partners. This represents a need for 
adaptability that current systems, such as the GOLD middleware [6] or the current 
B2B gateway [7], attempt to address by providing one type of security profile. 
The aggregated services are virtual music stores serving specialised markets or 
communities of interest. The basic service providers include copyright owners of 
musical recordings or their representatives who make these recordings available 
online and syndicated blogs or review sites. The music stores reach agreement with 
music providers enabling them to act as resellers of bundles of recordings from their 
catalogues. The virtual store is a VO consisting of the music store operator as well as 
content providers and it runs on top of an infrastructure provided by an infrastructure 
provider. 
This scenario is based on the increasing trend of Long Tail retailing. The Long Tail 
concept describes the niche strategy of selling a large number of unique items in 
relatively small quantities, usually in addition to selling fewer popular items in large 
quantities. The concept was popularised by Chris Anderson in [8], in which he 
mentioned Amazon.com and Netflix as examples of businesses applying this strategy. 
Figure 2 illustrates the Long Tail concept. 
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Figure 2. To the right is the long tail; to the left are the few that domin ate 19). 
The end customer of the virtual music store will be a member of the public. What they 
will see is a normal website where they will be able to search for and buy track and 
read reviews and blogs. This could be presented to them in much the same way a 
AbeBooks does, i.e. a search page and then each returned item is linked in from an 
independent seller; or stores could hide the aggregated nature of the service. 
1.1.1.2 Stakeholders 
In the music store, the main categories of partner are : 
• Infrastructure provider: This role involves providing the VMS with a Virtual 
Hosting Environment (VHE), the B2B gateway. The purpose of the infrastructure is to 
hide the technical complexity of the middleware involved to the different participants 
in the virtual music store. 
• Music content provider: This is a specialist content provider (e.g. record labels or 
other copyright owners). 
• Virtual music store operator: The broker of music. It is assumed that the store 
operator wi ll be the VO Initiator. As such the operator is responsible for instigating 
the opening federation process . 
• Value adding service provider: This is a third party entrusted with providing Value 
Adding Services (VAS). These services provide non-functional proprieties (e.g. 
security, audit, translation) and allow the content providers and music store operator 
to leverage on the VHE to enhance their interoperability and quality of service. 
1.1.1.3 VO LifecycIe 
So let us look closer into the life-cycle of the virtual music store. The music store life-
cycle starts with the initial agreements and discovery of the potential partners, the VO 
foundation. This is followed by the negotiation between these partners and the VO 
initiator to reach a firm collaboration agreement, this stage is called the partners' 
federation. Following this , the capabilities are virtualised and made available to the 
partners in the newly formed VO. Finally the adaptability faculty of the virtual store 
infrastructure is introduced. 
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VO foundation. Prior to any task and once the virtual shop has decided to establish 
the music store, it needs to reach an agreement with the infrastructure provider. The 
infrastructure provider is said to provide a VHE, on which it instantiates an 'empty' 
VO which is configured by the virtual shop operator. The VHE being in place, the 
shop operator contacts the potential participants of the music shop (i.e. content 
providers). Agreements are reached between these music providers and the shop 
operator and access to the VO Manager is granted to the content providers to setup 
their accounts and modify their data. The content providers can consequently publish 
the business functions they want to expose. These selected capabilities are published 
as services into a capability registry. 
Partner federation. At this stage it becomes possible for the virtual shop operator to 
put in place the different services offered by the music store. 
To achieve this, as introduced above, the operator creates a new VO for each 
federation of content providers it wants to create. Additionally, the operator defines a 
collaborative process to describe the interactions between the different business 
functions potentially present in the federation. Once this structure is in place, the 
operator can search the capability registry for the specific business functions it wants 
to aggregate and using the VO Manager sends a participation request to the relevant 
providers. 
The providers contacted can inspect the process description and interaction 
description already provided by the store operator to take a decision upon 
participating in this federation. Having accepted the invitation, the content providers 
associate to the VO the V AS profile they want to apply to this federation. The V AS 
profiles are defined for each capability by its provider. 
These profiles include infrastructure services used to secure and monitor the services. 
They are created and managed in much the same way as the federation between the 
operator and the music providers but include the V AS providers. The services are 
typically comprised of policy enforcement, authentication, authorisation and other 
added value services such as billing or auditing. In addition, the profiles are composed 
of policy templates that define the policies to be applied to each of the selected 
infrastructure services in the profile. 
Following this, the operator can review and select the best matches in the positive 
answers it has received. With all the targeted business functions fulfilled, the virtual 
shop operator can continue the VO creation process and sends a creation order. 
The VO management tool subsequently interacts with each partner's gateway. To 
allow the different identity providers to recognise each other's authority, it sends the 
relevant list of business cards associated with each business partner (role). In addition, 
the VO management tool sends the policies related to the implementation of the 
collaboration management for each business function. These policies come on the top 
of the security profiles setup and made available by the service providers. 
Brokered services, such as the jazz music store aggregating the different content 
providers' services that offer jazz music, can be created along with their federation 
data following this method. The jazz music store is illustrated in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3. The Jazz Music Store VO 
Capability virtualization. With the federation in place, it is poss ible for the 
participants to finalise the configuration of the instances of the services they selected 
and prepared for this specific VO. Before undertaking this, the gateway management 
interface allows the participant to inspect the configuration of its infras tructure. At 
this stage, the configuration of the infrastructure will have evolved as the serv ices are 
exposed and activated. Additionally, the selected Federated Identity Provider (FIP) 
has built trust with the FIPs of the other partners in the VO. Furthermore, the baseline 
policies that restrict who can issue access policies about which resources have been 
activated . 
Finally, the V AS profile that will be applied by the Partner for the business functions 
it performs is stored in a specific registry. To keep track of the configuration, the 
settings are associated with a unique collaboration rD. Upon configuration of the 
infrastructure, provisioning of policy templates and establishment of trust between the 
different VOs it becomes possible for the capability instances exposed to be invoked 
within the context of the virtual music store. 
Adaptability. A music provider might want to participate in several such federations 
to increase its visibility. But different partners in various VOs will have distinct 
security needs and settings. By adjusting the VAS profile used in each federation to 
its specific needs, the content provider can more promptly offer its services. 
1.2. Scope of work 
The ever increasing amount of IT services along with all the potential states and types 
of configurations necessitate the development of adequate methods and tools for 
services governance. In [10] , the concept of SOA governance is derived from 
corporate and IT governances. Corporate governance is referred to as the set of 
processes, customs, policies, laws and institutions affecting the way in which a 
corporation is directed , administered or controlled. IT governance is a subset of 
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corporate governance that focuses on the control, perfonnance and risk of IT systems. 
For SOA, the tenn governance refers to the processes used to oversee and control the 
adoption and implementation of an SOA in accordance with recognised policies, audit 
procedures and management policies. SOA governance aims at providing optimum 
service quality, consistency, predictability and perfonnance. An SOA governance 
environment should offer the ability to define, administer and enforce a combination 
of processes, practices and tools that facilitate the management of the life-cycle of the 
services in the SOA as well as the life-cycle of the different policies that apply on 
these services. 
Functional decomposition into services, reuse, loose coupling, and distribution of 
resources are all perceived benefits of the investment on SOA. This malleability can 
also bring about the risk of a more difficult oversight. As the same service is used in 
different applications the infrastructure will have to adapt to these different contexts 
of use in order to provide variations in required functionality, quality of service, 
billing schemes and security requirements. Achieving such variations in a cost 
efficient way can be achieved by composing the core business function offered by a 
service with other services implementing infrastructure capabilities that fulfil varying 
Non-Functional Requirements (NFRs). 
However, as the number of services increases and their use in different contexts 
proliferates, it becomes necessary to automate policy enforcement and compliance 
monitoring. Furthermore, the composition of services into different business 
applications over a common infrastructure intensifies the need for end-to-end 
monitoring and analysis to assess the business perfonnance impact. Managing the full 
life-cycle of service definition, deployment, exposure and operation requires 
management processes that take into account their composition with the infrastructure 
capabilities that take charge of the NFRs. Finally, policies may change during the life-
time of a service. Policy updates may be the result of various reasons including 
business optimisation, of reaction to new business opportunities, of risk / threat 
mitigation, of operational emergencies, etc. It becomes therefore clear that a well 
designed governance model is a prerequisite to successfully deploying services in a 
dynamic environment. More details on the objectives of such a SOA governance 
framework are given in the following paragraphs: 
• Resource contextualisation: Pennits resources to be efficiently configured 
for and managed at an end-to-end level is one of the main objectives of SOA 
governance. 
• Resource adaptation: Enables diagnosis and remediation in an as automated 
as possible fashion. SOA systems can potentially become very complex, with 
many different policies and services. This not only allows to adapt resources 
to specific transactions in function of an organisation's rules but to manage 
this adaptation in a more configurable, reliable and secured way. 
• Contextualisation safety: Manages the contextualisation so that contextual 
infonnation cannot infringe into another context. Safety mechanisms should 
also ensure that the adaptation does not result in a loss or inadequate sharing 
of data. 
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1.3. 
thesis 
Thesis contributions and overview of 
Section 1.2 identified three domains - resource contextualisation and adaptation as 
well as safety of the contextualisation process - that provide broad coverage of B2B 
interactions and a challenging set of requirements to support the governance of 
exchanges. In this context, the author's thesis contributes: 
1. A set of middleware services that provide an efficient support for flexible 
resource contextualisation. 
2. This enhanced flexible contextualisation can be governed in such a manner 
that it preserves the safety of the exchanges. 
This statement will be justified by the design, implementation and deployment of 
novel middleware. 
The remainder of the thesis substantiates the claim of novelty with respect to these 
systems. Before providing an overview of the thesis, the author elaborates on novel 
contributions in these three areas. 
1.3.1. Overview of thesis 
The work presented in this thesis addresses the research challenges identified in 
Section 1.2 by providing middleware to support the governance of B2B interactions. 
To this effect, the author proposes an SOA based architecture where the infrastructure 
capabilities providing support for NFPs that are not known a priori potentially come 
from third party providers. The approach is to provide a coherent definition of the 
interaction needs (i.e. in terms of NFPs) and compute these needs into an 
implementable and manageable aggregation of services. The architecture proposed 
also identifies the supporting - i.e. core - infrastructure necessary to provide the 
governance. The inherent flexibility of the architecture ensures that its 
implementation can be adapted to different application-specific requirements. Given 
this architecture, the author develops a prototype implementation. In addition, a proof-
of-concepts application demonstrates the utility of the architecture implementation in 
the domain of SOA security. The thesis has the following structure. 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of related works. The chapter concentrates on work 
on middleware that is fundamental to the architecture presented. The author also 
surveys work on contract-mediated interaction, policy driven middleware and on 
middleware support for flexible interactions management. 
Chapter 3 describes the anatomy of the SOA based architecture for service exposure 
governance that, along with its implementation and proof of concepts utilisation, are 
the novel contributions. The services are based on an interceptor-mediated view of 
interactions that: (i) allows end users (e.g. web service manager, other governance 
system) to define their requirements in term of NFPs, (ii) supports the design of 
adaptable services, and (iii) provides a set of processes to checks the safety of the 
adaptation. This chapter develops work first reported in [11], [12] and [13]. 
Chapter 4 describes the implementation of the architecture described in Chapter 3. A 
proof-of-concept application based on the example in Section 1.1.1 demonstrates the 
utility of the implementation. In addition, this chapter describes a qualitative 
evaluation of the proof-of-concept application. This is based on work first reported in 
[14] and [15]. 
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Chapter 5 concludes the thesis with a summary of contributions, including an 
evaluation with respect to the requirements set out in this chapter, and an overview of 
future work. 
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2. Background 
In this chapter, the author introduces the reader to the domain of software integration 
in distributed computing and reviews the most pertinent related. These are: software 
architecture definition in an SOA, flexible resource contextualisation in an SOA, and 
management of this contextualisation's safety (c.f. section 1.3). 
In section 2.1, the author introduces a short history of modem software integration 
through middleware. This part comprises content about how SOAs came to be and the 
development of the Enterprise Service Bus (ESB) concept which is a SOA based 
software infrastructure that acts as an intermediary layer of middleware through 
which distributed services and information can be made available. Section 2.2 
identifies the principal reference models and architectures that could influence the 
author's definition of a concrete architecture for governance of safe and flexible 
resource contextualisation in an SOA. Section 2.3 reviews the most relevant works in 
the domain of flexible contextualisation while part 2.4 evaluates their counterparts in 
the domain of contextualisation safety. Finally, a conclusion on the related work and a 
summary of the different research challenges is proposed in section 2.2. 
Throughout this chapter, the different elements described are assessed against 
potential research problematic that are then summarised in section 2.2.1. 
2. 1. The recent history of modern 
integration techniques 
Distributed systems have become more and more complex. This is partly due to the 
amount of technologies developed and the frequency in which they appear. In 
particular the amount of platforms implemented (e.g .. NET, Java, Axis, WebSphere) 
as well as the various specifications related to the different issues associated with 
Enterprise Application Integration (EAI) or SOA (with several standardisation bodies 
such as W3C, OASIS or WS-I) have rendered the middleware environment more 
opaque. This situation, linked with the raise of inter-application communications [16] 
and the possible repeated changes of partnerships in these interactions [17], have 
caused a situation where Return On Investment (RO!) and ease of integration can be 
difficult to reach. 
The traditional opportunistic integration is generally achieved using conventional 
application-to-application or point-to-point communication [18]. But these approaches 
have their limits. The complexity grows exponentially with the number of 
applications or points and the frequency they change. Furthermore, the maintenance 
and integration costs increase as the application becomes more complex. 
Therefore, one objective of more recent integration approaches is to reduce the 
complexity of integration by replacing the point-to-point ad-hoc with systematic 
integration through a specialised integration platform. In the next sections, this trend 
will be analysed and its main outcome in term of integration practice for SOA. 
2.1.1. Evolution of middleware 
The first wave of integration practices aimed to provide APIs and interfaces between 
systems. As shown on Figure 4, this was mostly achieved either using custom Remote 
Procedure Calls (RPC) or messaging technologies like CORBA. This generation of 
middleware primarily aimed to achieve point to point integration and most of the 
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connectors were custom built. This generally allowed heterogeneous systems to 
communicate and in the case of messaging technologies allowed to store and to 
forward messages. On the other hand, specific interfaces had to be de eloped for 
every system involved but at the same time the lack of widely spread communication 
semantics meant that many different formats prospered, thus generating a low Ie elof 
reusability and rendering all coding and maintenance complex. 
- - -------
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- - - ---- -
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Figure 4. Figure 1 Integration history [181 
Early 10's 
The next generation mainly aimed to improve the reusability as well as connectivity 
issues and introduced the spoke-hub distribution paradigm. Cornmon integration 
infrastructures subsequently developed include, application servers and EAl broker 
such as hub-and-spoke architectures that can potentially offer features such a 
message routing, transformation , business rules enforcement, transaction monitoring 
and auditing. This approach allowed reducing the connection complexity as with n 
nodes, a maximum of n - 1 routes are necessary to connect all nodes, compared to 
(n(n - 1))/2 nodes that would be required in a point-to-point network. In addition, this 
made possible to re-use and share the integratiol) logic among multiple expositions. 
These advantages provided connectors that were potentially faster to put in place and 
easier to maintain. However, the broker or application server due to its hub-and-spoke 
nature can create a bottleneck effect, impacting on the performance as well as creating 
a single point of failure. Furthermore, although this type of infrastructure can support 
exchange format standards, this aspect was still being neglected during this age. 
Finally, this type of middleware links the connected systems together in a tightly 
coupled fashion, as it often intertwines the application and the integration logic. 
With inter-application integration passing from a consideration to one of the main 
centres of interest, the current generation of middleware focuses on loosening the 
coupling and developing cornmon exchange semantics. This brought up the emerging 
growth of the SOA paradigm and technologies such as Representational State 
Transfer (REST) [19] or Web Services (WS) and Message Oriented Middleware 
(MOM) in particular. With this concept, distributed systems can rely upon 
independent services in which the application specific logic is independent from the 
connection infrastructure. In addition, with the adoption of XML and the large effort 
put into defining common specifications and standards, more flexibility has been 
granted. Both software layers' segregation and semantic rationalisation allow the 
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creation of applications that are built by combining loosely coupled and interoperable 
end points. Services are widely used to abstract different application specific logics to 
reflect business activities [20]. These activities can be reused and combined to 
compose new services or processes [21] without impacting the underlying activities. 
This is generally acknowledged as being the main commercial interest of SOA [22] as 
it allows a faster and safer ROJ. But one major factor that slows down the 
development of efficient process composition is the fair amount of hard coding still 
required by current middleware infrastructures to be connected to each other. 
Furthermore, the extensive use of connecting infrastructures, their complexity and the 
increasing need to connect them are rendering the middleware landscape more 
complex. 
The author acknowledges that the acronym SOA for some people is simply a 
marketing term for the packaging of the communication infrastructure, which in 
actual fact should not matter. Interoperability and connectivity issues have been 
discussed for the past 20 years, however what SOA has brought about is the need to 
integrate at the middleware level using standardised technologies. 
It is indeed interesting to note that while SOA eases the diversity and heterogeneity 
issues inherent to distributed systems; it does not completely solve them. In fact, the 
present standardised ways to abstract and simplify application specific logic used by 
middleware to address inter-software communication issues can also cause problems 
between middleware structures. These issues are intrinsic to heterogeneous 
environments where different interests and practices meet. The next generation of 
middleware should respond to this challenge and alleviate inter-middleware 
communications to allow more dynamic service and process compositions, thus 
enabling more effective business collaboration. This is suggested in the SOA Maturity 
model [23] Which advocates that top level SOA infrastructures should be able to more 
dynamically adapt to changes. 
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CMMI'": 4/ Measured.Business Transformation 
Quantitallvely Se!VICes 
Managed 
:v.: Business CMMISI: Services Defined a Colaborative b Services 
CMMI-: ft / 
Managed L./ Architected Services 
CMMI'M; 
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Initial Services 
Responsiveness 
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Functionality 
Figure 5. A Service-Oriented Architecture Maturity Model 123) 
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2.1.2. Enterprise Service Bus 
A poss ible way of potentially enhancing rniddleware adaptabihty has been found in 
leveraging the infrastructures and practices produced during the e olution of 
integration software previously introduced. 
The hub-and-spoke architecture has the benefit of being centralised, \ hich pro ide a 
good structure for key features such as message routing or auditing as well as allo\ a 
higher level of reusability. However it does not scale well across heterogeneous and 
large di stributed systems due to the centralised nature of the middleware it elf. In 
addition, the historical lack of common exchange semantics hinders the creation of 
evolving collaborations. These issues were partially solved by SOA but \ hile 
allowing a more loosely coupled model, it requires time consuming low level coding. 
Moreover in a highly evolving environment, Message Oriented Middleware (MOM) 
necessitates a higher level of abstraction to allow the reusability and integration Ie el 
necessary for a fast ROI. 
Figure 6 shows some of the higher level qualiti es of these infra tructure and 
introduces the concept of ESB. The ESB architecture appli es knowledge learnt 
throughout the evolution of middleware and attempts to leverage the technologie 
subsequently developed [24]. indeed the bus takes the centralised approached of the 
application server, the abstracted nature of the EAI broker wi th the di stributed nature 
of MOM to provide a so lution for rapidly adaptable middleware. 
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Application 
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Hub and spoke 
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Distributed 
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Figure 6. Integration approaches [25) 
Although the exact definition of ESB varies according to author, company or features 
it includes, it is possible to draw a general picture. 
An ESB is a SOA based software infrastructure that acts as an intermediary layer of 
middleware through which distributed end points are made available. It provides an 
abstraction layer that acts as entry point to a bus. Once the messages have been 
intercepted by the entry point, series of actions can take place in the bus. These 
actions take the form of services which are called according to various elements such 
as: message content, origin, destination and sets of rules predefined. 
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Figure 7. Generic ESB example 
Figure 7 shows a basic ESB infrastructure in which services can communicate 
through an abstracted interface provided by the bus. Once a message is received by 
the bus end-point, series of actions can take place. The type of action taki ng place i 
influenced by both the content of the messages received and the way the bus has been 
configured to handle them . In this specific example the bus offers authenti ca ti on , 
transformation, content base routing and orchestration services. Finall y, once th e 
messages have been treated it is sent to the appropriate end point with the suitable 
data. A more detailed discussion on ESB can be found in [26]. 
2.1.3. Conclusions on the recent history 
The concept of ESB tries to leverage di fferent technologies and des igns used 
throughout the middleware landscape thus moving away from the opportunisti c point 
to point inter-software communication and adopting the centrali sed approach already 
introduced by the traditional EAI broker. In addition, the ESB concept takes 
advantage of the SOA paradigm benefits which jointly provides a potential 
architecture for highly distributed and adaptable as well as loosely coupled 
middleware. Table 1 summarises the key elements discussed in this section . 
23 
Tables 1-4 legend: 
/ No support 
L Light support 
X Fully supported 
"First wave" 
of integration 
practices 
Spoke-hub 
distribution 
paradigm 
Custom built 
SOA 
middleware 
ESB 
(1) 
Reusability of 
integration 
layer 
/ 
L 
L 
L+ 
(2) Shared (3) 
communication Decentralised 
semantics model 
/ / 
/ / 
L X 
L+ L 
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However, if it is possible to increase the number of interaction enhancing 
infrastructures (.e.g. non-repudiation, message level security) offered by an ESB (c.f. 
[26] for list), it is clear that simply aggregating them does not suffice. Indeed, 
mechanisms to both define what infrastructures are to be used, how to use them and to 
provide a control over the information flow between these infrastructures are 
necessary. 
2.2. Models and architectures 
The main research challenge of this work is to investigate the two points listed in 
section 1.3 and provide a concrete architecture that describes a potentially 
implementable solution. There has been plenty of work from both academia and 
industry around the definition of architecture and indeed more specifically, 
architecture for SOA governance. Many of these works, such as [27] are not 
mentioned this section as they have not reached a certain level of visibility and or do 
not bring any addition to the models and architecture mentioned below. The following 
section reviews briefly the major efforts in this domain and describes their influential 
elements in the context of the current work. 
2.2.1. Reference models and architecture for SOA 
An abundance of specifications and standards have emerged from open standard 
organisations such as OASIS, OMG or The Open Group on the topic of SOA. In [28] 
the major instances are introduced and categorised. 
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These models and architectures, as expected from their status of "reference", do not 
present a readymade and expressive manner to implement a specific SOA. Indeed, 
they rather introduce the reader to the main artefacts forming a SOA along with, for 
some of them, guiding principles, processes, and technologies that could help 
organisations in the process of defining their own SOA. 
In [29] however, an Execution Context illustrates the set of technical and business 
elements that form a path between those with needs and those with capabilities in the 
context of service providers and consumers interaction. All interactions are grounded 
in a particular execution context, which permits service providers and consumers to 
interact and provides a decision point for any policies and contracts that may be in 
force. On Figure 8, the Execution Context is represented with its links to the 
Interaction and Contract & Policy elements. The presence of the Service and Service 
description elements on this figure also give us a sign of their importance in this 
context. 
Figure 8. Execution Context (29) 
Although this reference model provides valuable information on related concepts, it is 
insufficient to define a concrete architecture or implement a SOA governance 
infrastructure. Indeed, there is no description of the execution context itself or how it 
can be manipulated. These sets of information are necessary in order to design the 
contextualisation and adaptation processes which are key elements of the governance 
this thesis aims to describe. 
In [30], SOA governance is defined as: "Governance in the context of SOA is that 
organisation of services: that promotes their visibility; that facilitates interaction 
among service participants; and that directs that the results of service interactions are 
those real world effects as described within the service description and constrained by 
policies and contracts as assembled in the execution context." 
Figure 9 illustrates the vision of SOA governance in this report by lining the different 
types of governances within an organisation. 
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Always according to this report, SOA governance applies to three aspects of service 
definition and use: 
• SOA infrastructure - the "plumbing" that provides utility functions th at enable 
and support the use of the service 
• Service inventory - the requirements on a service to permit it to be acce ed 
within the infrastructure 
• Participant interaction - the consistent expectations with which all participant 
are expected to comply 
As introduced in section 1, this thesis specifically looks into supporting the fir t item 
on this list, the SOA infrastructure. 
With regards to this item, the Reference Architecture Foundation for SOA Vers ion 1.0 
defines ([30] page 95) a single requirement; a SOA governance architecture should 
take into account: 
• "Governance requires that the participants understand the intent of 
governance, the structures created to define and implement governance, and 
the processes to be followed to make governance operational. " 
This point is focusing on the visibility and readability aspects of the governance 
processes as well as the availability of these processes as SOA services. 
Although this reference architecture provides valuable information on related 
concepts and different requirements, it is insufficient to define a concrete architecture 
or design a SOA governance architecture. 
In [31] a SOA reference architecture is described. This reference architecture defines 
a governance layer that mostly aims at managing different types of policies such as 
QoS or security. It is unclear from its short description if this layer is meant to only 
verify the compliance of services against these policies or if execution is also thought 
of. 
However as illustrated on Figure 10, the authors of the SOA reference architecture 
take into account the challenge of contextualisation and interaction management. 
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This reference architecture does provide valuab le information about diff! rent 
requirements for SOA governance although they are not explicitly defined. Moreo er, 
there lacks a discussion on designing issues whi ch renders the creation of a concrete 
architecture and its implementation difficult to plan just from thi reference 
architecture. 
The most promising development with regard to an emerging SOA Governance 
architecture is the work conducted by the Open Group. Their proposa l, pre en ted in 
[32], for a SOA Governance framework describes the governance activities th at are 
impacted by an SOA and puts forward some best-practice governance rule and 
procedures for those activities. However, as of September 2009 it has on ly the tatu 
of a Draft Technical Standard and still lacks essential elements such as a specification 
of detailed accountabilities along the service life cycle or a sound taxo nomy that 
relates the core governance elements to each other. 
Two of the main goals of this document are to provide a definition of a SOA 
Governance Reference Model (SGRM) and its constituent parts as well as a SOA 
governance vitality method to guide the customisation of the aforementioned model 
for specific contexts. A relevant approach for this thesis in relation to these two points 
would be to see how they are defined and can be elaborated upon in order to provide a 
concrete architecture that allows designing an efficient SOA governance 
infrastructure. 
From the guiding principles listed in the SGRM and III the context of the current 
thesis the following points must be taken into account: 
• Contracts: provider and consumer contracts shall exist between service 
providers and consumers in order to ensure the correct delivery of service. 
• Service metadata: decisions and descriptions relating to services and their 
contracts shall be stored in a well known location, including relationships 
among services and their associated artefacts . 
• Automated processes: SOA Governance processes need to be automated as it 
improves the reliability and traceability of the governance. 
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The two first points on contract and service metadata are indeed crucial elements 
when designing a SOA governance, as they impact on the ways the sen·ice 
exposition, discovery and assembly processes will be achieved. But without a clearer 
definition, all the work of investigating these points is left to the entity designing the 
governance. These topics are complex research issues on their own and have seen 
consequent research and industry efforts in the past, with the most widely accepted 
outcomes being WSDL [33], SA WSDL [34], WSMO [35] and OWL-S [36]. But 
many other solutions have been provided (e.g. WADL [37], METEOR-S [38]). It is 
therefore unrealistic to go as far as advising a concrete technology or implementation 
stack at the generic concrete architecture level as each approach will have its own 
advantages and inconvenient. However, providing a set of general, but precise and 
helpful, requirements falls into the role of an architecture and this point is lacking in 
this work. 
Regarding this last point on processes, the SGRM defines three governing processes: 
compliance, dispensation, and communication which need to be performed on an 
ongoing basis. 
• Compliance: the purpose of this type of process is to define a method to ensure 
that the SOA policies, Guidelines and Standards are adhered to. The 
compliance process provides the mechanism for review and approval or 
rejection against the criteria established in the governance framework (i.e. 
principles, standards, roles, and responsibilities etc.). 
• Dispensation: this type of processes has the reverse function of the 
aforementioned type of compliance; it allows managing non compliance. 
• Communication: these processes ensure access to and use of governance 
information. 
These processes are during the three different stages of governance that are planning, 
design and operational. At the planning level, the processes are concerned with 
portfolio management. At design and operational time the governance processes aim 
at efficiently managing service and solution life-cycles. 
In the context of this thesis, only design and operational times are relevant. For these 
stages, the SGRM lists the principal following requirements: 
• Establishing and approving service 
• Publishing services to enable reuse 
• Managing mUltiple versions of a service 
• Enabling service assembly for building composite services and applications 
• Validating service contracts, functional and non-functional requirements 
• Ensuring change management for SOA services which includes accurate 
impact analysis of deployed services 
As for the contract and metadata points, this list of processes is a helpful hint of what 
needs to be taken into account. However, this work is lacking a discussion of the 
issues (e.g. virtualisation, management, safety) raised when designing these processes. 
The TOG SOA Governance Framework mainly aims at describing SOA governance, 
its goals and how it impacts on the enterprise from a management point of view. 
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There are relevant principles that can be learnt from it such a the poin Ii ted in thi 
section. However, as of the time of writing, this work is still a draft. dd itionally. it 
lacks the level of details about contextuali sation descri ption and execution that are 
vital for implementing contextualisation governance. 
2.2.2.Autonomic computing based SOA governance 
model 
The authors of [39] explore the relation between SOA Governance and utonomic 
Computing, showing how principles and properti es de eloped for the later an 
support SOA Governance. This leads the authors to create the term of utonomic 
SOA Governance Infrastructures (ASGI) which is a governance infra tructure \ ith 
autonomic capabilities . Following this , the authors describe a conceptual model for 
SOA governance based on the OASIS Reference Model for SO , the',: ork in [40] , 
[41] and [42]. This conceptual model is represented on Figure 11. 
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On this conceptual model , policies and processes are divided in two stages: 
• Design time governance: this group involves service identification, definiti on, 
creation and reuse. 
• Runtime governance: this comprises management of the service li fe-cyc le (i .e. 
deployment, consumption, versioning & change and retirement). 
In this context, [39] defines the two key elements of the model as being poli cy and 
processes . 
Governance policies: specify rules that SOA parties must adhere to. These can differ 
in function of the type, purpose and scope of the rule (e.g. business and corporate 
policies, behavioural policies, process policies, technical policies, QoS policie 
testing policies) . 
Governance processes: identify actions that when executed contribute to achieve the 
goals of SOA governance. 
With this in mind, [39] then approaches the autonomic computing domain and map 
the different types of governance policy to an autonomic property (Self-*). The 
attribute relevant to the current thesis is that of Self-configuration and its domain of 
application is defined according of the two stages aforementioned. 
• Design time Self-Configuration concerns governance policies scope updating. 
• Runtime Self-Configuration concerns enforcement of the governance policies. 
This conceptual model does not specify any concrete pattern for the enforcement of 
the policies it introduces, nor identifies what the governance processes are. However, 
it gives information about the different stages the governance is active at and what are 
the main concerns for each of these phases. 
2.2.3.Service Delivery Framework 
Twenty first century (2IC) Communication Service Providers (CSPs) are currently 
shifting their portfolios from traditional network-based to include more software-
orientated products and services. The boundaries between networks, Information and 
Communication Technologies (lCT) and applications become very blurred allowing 
for the integration of all these capabilities into new wave services. Service Delivery 
Platforms (SDPs) [43] are the technology environments that facilitate this integration. 
More specifically, an SDP aims at enabling rapid development and deployment of 
new converged multimedia services. These services are composed of telecoms and IT 
capabilities. As illustrated in Figure 12, an SOP sits in the middle and bridges across 
to different sources of service capability. Examples of such capability include 
telephony, wireless, IP, content, Operational Support Systems (OSS) and 3rd party. 
Capabilities are exposed through standard functional interfaces. SOPs typically 
provide a service control environment, a service creation/assembly environment, a 
service orchestration and execution environment and abstractions for media control, 
presence/location, integration and other low-level communications capabilities. They 
are used for the composition of both consumer and business applications. In order to 
make SDPs carrier grade, i.e. sufficiently reliable and scalable for CSP adoption, it is 
current best practice to apply SOA principles to expose service capability, being 
network, OSS or 3rd party, through SOA adapters into a SOA based SOP [44]. The 
latter constitutes an IT platform, mostly an application server, using Web Service or 
other SOA technology standards to integrate services and compose applications. 
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Figure 12. Service Delivery Platforms 
SDPs available today are optimized for the delivery of a service in a gi n 
technological or network domain (examples include web, !MS, IPTV Mobile T , 
etc .). 
There is lack of standardi zation work for SDPs. This gave ri se to the TM Forum ' 
Service Delivery Framework (SDF) programme [45]. In the context of SDF ervlce 
are defined as components that expose their functionality via one or more functional 
interfaces . A service becomes an SDF Service when it ex poses one or more OF 
Service Management Interfaces (SDF SMI) which manage the service lifecycle. The 
SDF programme focuses on the management of SDF Service , where management i 
referred to SDF Service Lifecycle management. 
11111 
SDF M;mageme nt 
Support Services 
(S DF MSS) 
-- ----SDF Infrashuclure Support Service 
Functronallnterfa ce 
------
SDF SelVlte 
SDF SI?MCe FunclJonallnlerface 
an~ment SDF SPf'1 e __ 
In le~ace 11 ~ n ~ge<n""t 
pmel .Inl~rra(e <R~ name> SDF Services 
SDFISSr ~ ----~- l Consume InfrastrucbJre Resource 
Consumer Consume 
/t SDF Infr:l s tru cture Support Service s Resources 
IS DF ISS 
Figure 13. TMF Service Delivery F ramework Reference Model 
SDF 
SelVlce 
Consu-ner 
Figure 13, depicts a typical SDF service and the overall SDF Reference Model [46]. 
Functional capability of an SDF Service is exposed through service functional 
interfaces (SDF SFls), which are graphically shown as "lollipops'. Special case of 
SFIs are the SDF SMIs which contain lifecycle management capabilities of the SOF 
Service. Such capabilities include, but are not limited to: configuration, performance 
management, retIrement, fault handling, versioning, monitoring and usage. 
Finally, an SDF Service may itself rely on capabilities exposed by other services. This 
is called SDF Service consumer and is graphically denoted by a "socket'·. The rest of 
Figure 13 illustrates the SDF Reference Model comprising: SDF Management 
Support Services (SDF MSS): SDF MSS are responsible for the end-to-end SDF 
Service lifecycle management. This includes the support for operational (e.g. 
provisioning, installation, update/activation, monitoring capabilities) as well as 
business process automation. SDF MSS capabilities may either invoke SDF SMI 
capabilities, in which case they receive SDF Service management meta-data, or 
invoke other support services from the Infrastructure or the Management Services 
domains of Figure 13. 
Infrastructure and SDF Infrastructure Support Services (SDF ISS): the Infrastructure 
domain provides specific capabilities to Management processes or SDF MSS that are 
usable across all SDF Services and facilitate their lifecycle management. 
These capabilities constitute the SDF ISSs. Examples of SDF ISSs include: SDF 
Service catalogues, metadata repositories, user data (specific information for 
subscribers or other actors), resource management capabilities and charging 
capabilities. 
Resources: Resources are capabilities that can be used by SDF Services and are 
exposed by network, IT infrastructure, OSSIBSS applications, or services on the 
Internet. They can exist anywhere, within or outside the esP's domain, and offer their 
capability to SDF Services through their functional interfaces. 
Its issuance from existing implementations into a reference model and its concrete 
approach make the SDF an interesting model to draw knowledge from. The main 
components of the framework as well as their relationships and the way they interact 
with their managed resources are described in the context of service delivery. 
However the SDF does not take the contextualisation governance domain into account 
and key elements such as policies or element visibility are note thought off. 
2.2.4.Conclusions of reference models and architectures 
The models and architectures for SOA, SOA governance and service delivery 
introduced above define, to a certain extent, the main architectural elements forming a 
SOA as well as the principal concepts related to governance. Indeed, these works 
define key concepts such as run and design times governance together with their roles. 
In addition the core concepts around service interaction (e.g. behaviour) are 
introduced and the main elements needed to manage the delivery of services are 
defined (e.g. management services). Table 2 summarises the key elements discussed 
in this section. 
Tables 1-4 legend: 
/ No support 
L Light support 
X Fully supported 
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Table 2. Comparison of reference models and architecture for SO.\ 
However, these references do not specify how to design the process of 
contextualisation and manage the visibility of the different elements required to enact 
it. 
2.3. Flexible contextualisation 
An area of interest that has focused on certain aspects of this investigation and that 
has received interest from the research community is the management of NFPs as a 
way to improve the adaptability of a resource exposed over the network. 
Using previous work on NFP description (c.f. section 2.2 Conclusions of related 
works) and how to allow a concrete separation between a resource's functionality and 
its NFPs has been investigated. 
In [47] a solution is proposed to manage a Web service NFPs using handlers. This 
work proposes a new model-driven development (MDD) framework, through the 
notion of feature modelling, to explicitly and graphically model a series of non-
functional constraints in SOA. The framework consists of a: 
• feature model: that defines non-functional properties in SOA. 
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Figure 14. An Architectural Overview of th e MOD fr a mewo rk proposed in 1471 
The architecture proposed by the authors of the MDD fram ework is illustrated in 
Figure 14. By allowing developers to model NFP as features, the proposed framework 
allows logically constructing and validating NFPs in SOA. Ark automati ca ll y 
enforces NFPs in applications by transfoI111ing a feature configuration to app li ca ti on 
code with UP-SNFRs. 
The separation of concerns between the different levels of abstract ions in the domai n 
model, the NFP as a feature descriptions and the genera ti on of app li cat ion code all ow 
decoupling the descriptions of the different types of NFPs poss ible from th e spec ifi c 
handlers implementing them and the way they will be aggregated to upport the 
exposure of the service. 
However by using a strategy that provides NFPs by the way of handlers the author 
assume that the service providers take ownership of the NFPs implementations which 
limits their reuse and availability. In addition , this framework does not provide any 
support for the service life-cycle management which restricts the use of the service in 
one particular context. Finally, the use ofNFP profil es could all ow the use of different 
semantics and grammars, providing another level of fl exibili ty, but current approaches 
have not investigated this possibility. 
In [49] , the authors present a Security Service Bus (SSB), an infrastructure that relies 
on a communication bus for providing flexible composition between application 
components and security components and mutuall y between security components. 
This SSB is evaluated against a scenario with a personal content management system 
platform that aims to offer its users a uniform interface for managing and sharing their 
personal content that is scattered over various devices. 
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Figure 15. SSB-based Composition of the Application with Security Components [49\. 
In the SSB there are two types of component security and application bindings. 
Security: this type provides the security functionalities. It is assumed in this 
architecture that the security components are reusable modules that can be invoked, 
managed and composed with applications and with each other. The functionality is 
expressed through a security interface and the component can be configured through a 
management interface. 
Application binding: This type of component has two roles enforcing decisions and 
providing policy information. 
In this architecture, the aggregation of components is made through an artefact named 
the security contract. This contract is expressed using the same data model as the one 
used to define component interfaces. It comprised two parts: the required and 
provided sections, defining what is expected from a contract and what is offered. 
The SSB architecture describes a component based design that supports run time 
aggregation of security related functionalities. However, this work only takes into 
account security related functionalities, more complex exposure requirements that 
encompass more than security may require a different type of architecture. In 
addition, the SSB does not show how to support the life-cycle of the aggregation of 
added functionalities which is an important factor when dealing with independent, 
distributed components that could be, for instance, unavailable at times. Finally, the 
SSB does not describe how to support the management of components fulfilling the 
security contract. The author believes that such architecture should define at a more 
concrete level this type of mechanism rather than stating the existence of a 
management interface. 
2.3.1. Conclusions of flexible contextualisation 
The works discussed in the previous section present interesting characteristics as well 
as limitations for the domain of flexible contextualisation. In this section, both 
advantages and limitations are presented together with their impacts on the current 
thesis. 
Both MDD and SSB demonstrate that the hard coded handlers approach, which is 
currently the most widely spread approach [50], has strong limits in terms of 
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flexibility and reusability. In an distributed environment where components could be 
reused many times, the impact changes on these components could have on their 
many clients could prove difficult to manage. Additionally, unless a strict control is 
put in place and a physical track of what handler is used on what service kept, keeping 
track of their usage in large scale systems seems effort consuming and further 
advocates against this practice. Moreover, managing the exposition of a same service 
in different contexts is difficult as the handlers are hard coded. Finally, hard coding 
the handlers into the service themselves can be costly time wise as a developer is 
required to understand how they work and how they can be assembled with the 
service they are expected to support the exposition of. 
The MDD [47] approach deals with this limitation by dynamically aggregating 
handlers in a NFP profile through a model. This method presents the benefit of 
dividing the representation of the contextualisation strategy (i.e. NFP profile) from the 
complete domain definition (i.e. feature meta model) and from the run 
implementation of the strategy. This allows for more flexibility and reuse. However, 
the code enacting each NFP cannot be shared and allowed to evolve (e.g. 
reconfigured). 
The SSB approach attempts to mitigate this limit by using distributed components that 
can be invoked and configured to fulfil the NFPs. For supporting the exposition of 
services in large scale distributed systems, this technique of using discoverable and 
configurable network enabled components looks more efficient in regards of early 
comments. Not only does it allow reuse and configuration for specific contexts but 
through the use of a common transport layer it permits to keep track of what 
components are used in what context. Furthermore, it authorizes the governance 
infrastructure to audit the message exchanges and evaluate how the components 
perform. 
Yet these different techniques still present strong limitations. They necessitate an 
additional layer in order to allow using a resource in different contexts. In addition, 
they do not allow controlling the life-cycle of the NFP profile, which would bring 
further flexibility. Furthermore, they each use their own set of NFP description 
semantics which can be a limited approach when dealing with distributed resources 
that can be deployed in different organisations or countries. 
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2.4. Safety of contextualisation 
There is no work, as far as the author is aware, that targets the safety of 
contextualisation processes or middleware for distributed systems. 
However, the domains of contextualisation can be, in this context, divided into two 
parts, the validity of the contextualisation strategy (c.f. NFP profile in section 2.3) and 
the security of the message exchanges between the different components enacting this 
strategy and the infrastructure supporting these exchanges. 
In the context of this work, the optimal solution to support a flexible contextualisation 
strategy is an aggregation of distributed and reusable components that can be 
managed. Indeed, section 2.3 demonstrates that this approach is optimal to provide 
adaptive contextualisation for SOA. In order to control the safety of this strategy it is 
therefore critical to control what components are selected and the manner they are 
aggregated. Dynamic selection and composition of distributed components, such as 
web services, is a complex research topic on its own and will not be discussed here. 
The reader can instead refer to key works in this domain such as [51] or [52]. It is 
however noticeable that dynamic composition of services aims at bringing flexibility 
about the services selected, as opposed to allowing defining and enacting a 
contextualisation strategy. 
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SOA security will not be examined in this work as it is a complex research topic on its 
own. 
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The present work does not aim at making significant contributions in these two fields. 
It aims however at leveraging on them in this new context in order to provide an 
enhanced investigation. 
2.1. SOA Governance 
SOA governance has been much talked about over the past few years. Industry 
middleware actors (e.g. SOA middleware vendors, consultants) have been the biggest 
sources of both hype and innovation [10]. 
The term "SOA governance" has also sometimes been treated as a marketing term for 
the packaging of the set of features that allow managing and improving the visibility 
of distributed resources. Such issues are well understood and solutions have been 
researched and developed for the past 1 0 years. In fact, SOA governance frameworks 
build on top of such work by addressing the need to make the supporting service 
management and monitoring layer interoperable and introduce processes that allow 
governing mUltiple interrelated services and policies in SOA deployments as one 
whole. 
ESB vendors, services deployment platforms and Service registry providers (e.g. HP, 
IBM) include what they define as governance tools in their products. These products 
such as HP Systinet with its Governance Interoperability Framework (GIF) [55] or 
IBM WebSphere Service Registry and Repository (WSRR) [56] are mainly providing 
service registry and metadata (e.g. policy) repository services along with their 
supporting features. Some of these products also provide some support for service 
versioning and policy as well as service management. These are valuable 
contributions towards a common SOA governance specification. However, these 
products only address the challenges of visibility and for some of them policy 
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admi~istration and management which, although are central issues, do not provide 
solutIOns for the problem of service provisioning. Indeed, preparing SOA assets to be 
used by consumers in a flexible and efficient manner is a key aspect of SOA 
governance as it allows reducing integration expenses. 
2.2. Conclusions of background 
The work surveyed in section 2, and the short history of integration techniques, can be 
viewed as the basis to provide resource exposition governance in a flexible and 
efficient manner. The surveyed work illustrates the need to design the architecture of 
the governance infrastructure as a distributed system where elements can be 
discovered, assembled and managed adequately. An aim of this work is to provide a 
concrete architecture that allows for safe and flexible governance of resource 
exposition in SOA as proposed in section 3. 
Another area of interest that has focused on certain aspects of governance and that has 
received more interest from the research community is the description of Quality of 
Service (QoS) attributes, NFPs, services functionalities and architecture descriptions. 
Several projects have looked into different ways of defining and expressing NFPs, 
using either Architecture Description Language [57], taxonomy [58] or ontology [59]. 
Some of these projects do not target any precise type of IT systems [57], while a few 
specifically investigate the domain of SOA [58]. As underlined at several points (c.f. 
2.2.2, 2.2.3) in the previous section on related works, being able to describe the 
different components of a dynamic system is a critical element. However the author 
feels that this topic has already reached the stage where efficient descriptions of 
architectures, services and their properties can be used. Additionally, as illustrated 
several times in the aforementioned works, knowledge can be delegated to a specific 
layer of an architecture. 
In the next chapter, the research challenges for flexible and safe resource 
contextualisation in a SOA are summarised. 
2.2.1. Summary of research challenges 
Large scale and dynamic service-oriented systems require a set of technologies and 
mechanisms to be deployed in order to be rendered more easily manageable and 
transparent through governance. A wide spectrum of complementary concerns needs 
to be taken into account when designing such a solution. 
The following challenges have been defined using the scenario described in section 
1.1 and the description of the related works listed in chapter 2. 
1. Reusability of integration layer. The different functionalities forming the 
governance infrastructure and Value Adding Services (VAS) that may be invoked 
should be adequately segregated so as to allow reuse. 
2. Shared communication semantics. Interoperability is a key element in 
middleware design. 
3. Decentralised model. The governance infrastructure should enable a flexible 
resource location mechanism where the choice of the resource depends on contextual 
information in addition to the network endpoint of the governed services. 
Additionally, the infrastructure should support resource virtualisation, policy 
segregation and execution state in multi-tenancy usage scenarios. 
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4. Definition of SOA governance and related concepts. For the readers of the 
concrete architecture it is critical to explicitly make the goals understandable. 
5. High level description of key contextualisation elements and concepts. For the 
concrete architecture to be implemented, its different elements and their relationships 
must be made understandable. 
6. Technical description of key contextualisation elements and their 
relationships. For the concrete architecture to be implemented, the way its different 
elements can be designed and assembled must be defined. 
7. NFP description model. A model or sets of models allowing the different elements 
potentially entering in the resource exposition governance should be provided. 
Alternatively or in addition, this type of model should be extendable. 
8. NFP profile description. A resource provider should be allowed to express 
resource exposition requirements. 
9. NFP profile instance. A same profile description can be enacted using different 
middleware. This includes allowing the selection of infrastructure capabilities and the 
corresponding policy schemes. 
10. Reusable & manageable NFP providers. When relevant, the different elements 
composing a resource's exposition and its supporting infrastructure should be 
proposed in such a manner that they can be configured for the specific interactions 
they required for. In addition, the use of reusable elements should be supported. 
11. Run time aggregation of NFPs. The composition of the different elements 
composing a resource's exposition and its supporting infrastructure should be 
supported at run time. 
12. Domain agnostic. The exposition governance should not be specialised into a 
specific kind of exposition attribute. Additionally, it should not allow governing the 
exposition of only a specific type of resource. 
13. Life-cycle management of the aggregation of NFPs. The composition of 
reusable and manageable elements supporting the exposition of a resource should be 
made manageable as a process. As such, the governance infrastructure should allow 
for the management of its life-cycle. 
14. Semantically described components. The different elements entering in a 
exposition and its support should be adequately describe to allow for their automatic 
discovery and usage. 
15. Semantic agnostic. The infrastructure should enable translating its own internal 
understanding of what are the objectives for specific governance instances into a way 
that is comprehended by partners. 
16. Support for end to end message level security. The proposed architecture 
should ensure a safe exposition of the services. Potential clients or threats should not 
be able to bypass the governance capability put in place due to one of its capabilities 
failure (e.g. security, bad design). 
17. Verify validity of the contextualisation strategy. A resource provider should be 
allowed to express its needs in a clear manner that doesn't leave any ambiguity as to 
how the governance should enact them. It should also support communicating 
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governance requirements to trusted partners and ensure consistency persists between 
the internal governance logic and what is advertised or agreed persists. 
As shown in this section, there currently is no model, architecture or technology that 
fulfils the aforementioned sets of challenges. Instead, vendors have a tendency to 
aggregate the different products they have developed over the years that supports the 
management of distributed resources and academic works tend to investigate specific 
issues related to this topic. Finally the architectures and models proposed by open 
groups of experts are too abstract and general to allow implementing such 
middleware. 
These challenges, coupled with leveraging the technical advantages discussed in the 
previous section on background, led to singling out a specific architecture which, 
according to the author experience and previous work in this domain (c.f. section on 
summary of contribution) sufficiently address the core need of exposition governance 
for SOA. 
41 
3. Anatomy of a SOA governance architecture 
In Chapter 2, the author described relevant background and related works. Four main 
areas, evolution of middleware, models and architectures, flexible contextualisation 
and safety of contextualisation have allowed the identification of 17 research 
challenges. 
3. 1. Introduction of the anatomy 
In the following section, the concrete architecture for governance of safe and flexible 
contextualisation of resources for SOA governance is presented. Initially, the author 
defines the main concepts necessary to the good understanding of the anatomy's 
description. Next, the data structures used in the concrete architecture are presented. 
Then, the components forming the architecture are described and categorised in either 
a core category or a management category. Finally, the processes that link these 
different data structures and components are shown. 
This architecture is meant to be platform and language independent and no specific 
tools or frameworks will be discussed in this chapter. 
The elements defined in this section are derived from the knowledge acquired through 
Chapter 2. Additionally, the implementation described in section 4.2 relies on the 
concepts, data structures, components and processes described in the current chapter. 
3.2. Anatomy concepts 
Prior to the descriptions of the concrete elements forming the architecture it is 
necessary to define several key concepts: capability, policies, processes, users, and 
governance times. 
3.2.1. Capability 
Capability: a capability is a functional unit in the governance context. Each capability 
is assumed to be capable of being deployed as a web service with its own service 
management, policy administration framework (control pane) and operational 
interfaces (data pane). Each capability is also policy driven as this permits 
configurability and flexibility. The different capabilities are meant to have their own 
distinct grammars and policy languages in order to keep their own advantages, 
capacities and evolution potential in their respective domains. For instance, the 
identity and access management can be separated and can use different grammars. 
The interoperability issues generated by this situation are addressed at the messaging 
level, which is in itself a core capability, and through transformations that are possible 
thanks to transformation policies as shown in the transformation process step (section 
3.5 point 7). 
This also enables the interchange of core capabilities within their categories and 
according to the research challenges specified in section 2.2.4 when necessary. Non-
core capabilities (e.g. auditing) can also be added through the same manner. 
All capabilities are either a business or an infrastructure: 
Business capability: This is an organisation's traditional function (e.g. accountancy, 
fleet management, credit check). It is exposed as a service and can be the result of an 
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aggregation of other business capabilities. In the case of the virtual music store 
content providers are business capabilities. 
Infrastructure capability: This is a supporting capability fulfilling non-functional 
requirements such as identity management or access control. In an SOA, a set of 
infrastructures are typically aggregated to support the exposition of a business 
capability. Infrastructure capabilities can be segregated in two categories: core and 
non-core. Core infrastructures are functionalities that are vital to the governance 
architecture internal behaviour, these are described in section 3.4.1. The non-core 
infrastructures can include all type of non-functional property providers (e.g. billing, 
audit, transport protocol). 
Some capabilities may be treated as business in a context and infrastructure in 
another. For instance, an identity management service in the virtual music store use 
case is treated as an infrastructure as it provides a non functional property. However, 
the identity management service can make use of its own exposure governance in 
which context it is treated as a business capability. 
Section 3.4 on Components anatomy presents the components specific to exposure 
governance. 
3.2.2. Policies 
Policies are documents describing behaviours that capabilities or processes must 
comply with. They typically comply with different specific standards (e.g. WS-Policy 
[63], XACML). The main issues about policy in the governance framework are their 
enforcement and the potential necessity to translate same policies into different 
grammars (e.g. an access control infrastructure could be using either XACML or 
SecPAL). In the following paragraphs, the main policy types of SOA governance are 
introduced. 
Profile policies: Profile policies identify and define policies or template that applies 
within their domains. The most important ones will regard the dependences and 
constraints related to the use of a profile. 
Infrastructure capability policies: These policies are attached to particular 
infrastructures and consider potential 110 metadata, usage and management schemes. 
Business capability policies: The business capabilities are similar to the infrastructure 
but for the possibility to assign exposure strategies to them. 
Section 3.3 on Data structures anatomy shows the data specific to exposure 
management. 
3.2.3. Processes 
A process is a procedure that uses the above building blocks in order to meet exposure 
governance objectives. A distinction can be made between governance as we~l .as 
policy and service management processes. The management processes target ~oh~les 
(e.g. authoring, association, enforcement, reporting) and services (e.g. pubhcatlOn, 
exposure) and are outside of the scope of this investigation. The governance processes 
aim at coordinating management and exposure governance processes. 
Section 3.5 on Processes anatomy describes the processes specific to exposure 
governance. 
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3.2.4. Users 
User: the entity, phys ical or logical that uses a service. More concretely in the current 
context, there are three types of user: 
Business or infrastructure capability administrator: these users should be allo\ ed to 
define their requirements andlor to specify the context in which their resource hould 
be exposed. They can also change the configuration of the profiles they \ ant applied 
to their resources. An infrastructure administrator can also change the de cription of 
its resources or when relevant change the context (e.g. SLA, type of client) the 
infrastructure will be available for. 
For instance, a music content provider, as a business capability is admini tered b a 
user. The same applies to an infrastructure capability such as an identity management 
servIce. 
Governance administrator: much in the same way as the capabi li ty admini trator 
this user can modify the configuration or change the services that serve a cor 
capabi lities. 
Another system: as specified in section 2.2.4 on research challenges there i a need 
for automation of management tasks. Through the management interface, oth r 
systems such as another governance middleware or a management tool can extract, 
modify or deleted data (c.f. section 3.6 on Usage patterns). This type of acce 
managed in the same way as human user in regards to securi ty. 
3.2.5. Governance times 
This governance architecture targets two phases, the des ign and run times of the 
capabil ities which contextualisation it is meant to govern . 
Design time governance: at design time, users are allowed to define their choice in 
terms of exposition behaviour. This phase is illustrated in Figure 16 where a u er 
configures part of the governance to suits its needs. 
Co nf igu res 
User 
Figure 16. Design time governance 
Run time governance: At run time, the governance enacts the requirements specified 
at design time and allows for the conversations between the business capabil.ities, and 
its clients to take place. This is achieved by brokering the messages formlO g these 
interactions and by aggregating infrastructure capabilities which provide the ~Ps . 
This stage is shown on Figure 17 where the governance middleware links the buslOe 
capability to a client and call infrastructure capabilities to supply the FPs for the 
interaction. In this case, the infrastructures are sitting somewhere 10 the Cloud [66] , 
but different options for their deployments are proposed in section 3.6.1. 
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The separation between these two stages is not always as clear as it appear in Figu re 
16 and Figure 17. Indeed, the need to re-configure the properti es or the quality of the 
enactment of an interaction can ari se during run time and requires the governance to 
at least partially fall back to the design time phase. Additionall y, the registrati on of 
new infrastructure capabilities can happen at any moment, so do the potenti al changes 
in their configurations or in the content of any policy they make use of. 
3.3. Data structures anatomy 
Following is the list of the core data elements that take part in the governance model 
and their properties . 
3.3.1. Infrastructure profile 
Infrastructure profiles are descriptors that define which aggregation of infrastructure 
capabilities (e.g. security services, audit) to use for the exposition of a bus iness 
capability along with the different constraints associated with the use of these 
capabilities. Each profile associates infrastructures with their corresponding policy 
schemes, dependences (policy and service) and management processes. 
In order to achieve this, the NFP requirements of the resource exposed are expressed 
in a normalised manner in a profile document which is used to defi ne the way the 
resomce is exposed. Figure 18 illustrates the schema that formall y defines the data 
structure of the profile description. The XML schema can be foun d in appendix I and 
an instance of a profile can be found in section 4.2.4 . In the following paragraphs the 
different elements fom1ing the profile data structure are defi ned. Element name are 
gIven In bold and concrete examples following the virtual music store u e case 
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Figure 18. Illustration of the Profile definition XM L schema 
A WS-Profile is the top element of the description, it is uniquely identified by a 
number. Concretely, a profile could be use to "expose a music content provider 
service" in the context of the virtual music store. 
The profile is composed of one-to-many Service Types that provides the top level of 
abstraction from a capability functionality and categorisation point of view. An 
examples of service types are "identity management" and "access control 
management" . 
Each service types can provide different Interfaces that allow to further decompo e 
the logical structure of the profile. Examples of interfaces are 'management" and 
"operationar'. 
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The next level of decomposition is the Functionality which allow to differentiate 
practical aspects of the same interface. Examples of functionalities are "user 
management" and "token management". 
Finally, the Operations permit to describe concrete pieces of distributed software in 
the most granular manner. Examples of operations are "add user" and "delete token". 
It is noticeable that the structure defined above matches closely the structure of 
WSDL [33]. This reflects the SOA nature of the architecture proposed while allowing 
users to define their needs in terms of NFPs as well as the governance system to 
locate and classify capabilities. 
All Service Type, Interface, Functionality and Operation elements listed above 
inherit from a common element Activity. Activities allows to specify Constraints to 
these elements. A constraint permits to define the data flow between the different 
elements of the profile. For instance, before using an "validate token" operation, the 
operation "build trust" is required to be used. In the same manner, data types 
requirements can be specified. A certain "XACML access control policy template" can 
be attached to specific "evaluate assertion" operation. 
This granular approach aims to allow the definition of different levels of abstraction 
when writing the profile. For instance, a music content provider administrator may not 
be knowledgeable in security but trusts the governance provider to be. In this case the 
first could specify in its profile a simple "service type" "security". The governance 
through the taxonomy describing the infrastructure capabilities would then be able to 
refine "security" into "identity management" and "access controf' and subsequently 
build a concrete exposition profile. Similarly, a music content provider administrator 
user requesting a profile could specify two "service types" "access controf' and 
"identity management" and leave the selection of the appropriate specific and more 
technical choices to the instance of the governance architecture that is governing its 
exposure. On the other hand a knowledgeable business capability administrator could 
go as far as specifying the anatomy of "access controf' infrastructure capabilities it 
wants with specific "security policy grammar" and ''policy templates". 
The author is aware that methods for dynamic service selection based on taxonomy or 
ontology exist. These methods can allow functionality based selection as well Quality 
of Service (QoS) and Service Level Agreement (SLA). However it is not the objective 
of the current work to investigate this topic. The proposed approach is to provide 
answers to the challenges of dynamic selection of infrastructure capability and their 
aggregation. 
Management plan: The management plan is a specific type of WS-Profile and is 
provided by infrastructure capability providers and compiles the necessary steps 
necessary to achieve in order to include provided activities. For instance, a "XACML 
policy decision point access control" infrastructure capability provider can specify 
that before using the "evaluate access request" "operation" the "operation" "build 
trust" needs to be successful. 
Coordination plan: The coordination plan is another type of WS-Profile that is 
progressively assembled and completed with the business capability exposition 
profile. The coordination plan is an ordered list of management plans that nee~ ~o be 
taken into account in order to activate an instance of the profile. Additional 
coordination plans can be provided for the different stages in a profile life-cycle: 
deactivate, reactivate and remove. 
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In Figure 19, the different entities forming the profile and their relationship are 
shown. 
Functionality ~ Operation 
References 
Comp let es 
Figure 19. Profile desc ription ta xo nomy 
3.3.2. Context 
Contexts are documents that allow the specification of a) a domain of 
contextualisation and b) what is the data specific to this domain . Another document 
called a context selector, allows c) associating profiles and context. 
Figure 20 illustrates the schema that formally defines the data structure of the context 
description. The XML schema can be found in appendi x 2 and an instance of a 
context can be found in section 4.2.4 . 
Context specific data: The context specific data is a combination of data passed to 
the profile instantiation by the business capability and data created by infrastructure 
capabilities passed to others through the governance model in order to configure 
them. For instance, when requesting security in the exposition profi le, a music content 
provider can pass its own "credentials" in order to complete the context. In the XML 
context definition, this part is defined by the configData element, the target being the 
activity in the profile the data applies to. 
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Figure 20. Illustration of the Context definition XML schema 
3.3.1. Context selector 
Association of profiles and contexts : This document all ows to link different context 
to the profiles their associated with. 
Domain of contextualisation: The domain of contextualisation all ow the 
governance architecture to recogni se what a context applie to. The interception 
domain is a combination of a potentially shared scope and state. This allow linking a 
profile to business capabilities or message exchanges. This part of the context i 
typically formed by a "transaction ID", a "federation ID" as introduced in [53] , a 
WS-Addressing [62] "message ID" or even an operation type the profile instance is 
required for (e.g. "request" or "response"). In the XML context definition, thi s part is 
defined by the configSelector, the target being the identifier of the document 
containing the selection logic, the data being the potential representation of the 
selection logic (i.e. if it is a simple XPath in the implementation proposed) and the 
operation being request, response or both. 
Up time: This element allows specifying the availability of the exposition. For better 
performance, the profile and exposition logic can be requested to be maintained "all 
the time". Alternatively, the exposition logic can be maintained "only when relevant" 
or at ''precise dates and times". In the XML context definition, this part is defined by 
the upTime, the type allowing to define periods the profile will be maintained for. 
Figure 21 illustrates the schema that formally defines the data structure of the context 
selector description. The XML schema can be found in appendix 3 and an instance of 
a context selector can be found in section 4.2.4. 
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Figure 21. Illustratio n of the Context Selector definition XM L schema 
3.3.2.Summary of the data structure descriptions 
Each exposure, with its data flows , dependencies, policie and management proces e 
is defined through the three data structures defined above : profile, context and context 
selector. These elements, together with the capabilities they are attached to along with 
their relationships are recapitulated in Figure 22 . 
Figure 21 illustrates that a profile instance is fonned by the combination of a profil e 
and contextual data. This contextual data is divided into two categories: profil e and 
capability oriented. 
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Figure 22. Governance data model concepts and their relationship 
3.4. Components anatomy 
Business 
capabi lity 
In the following chapters, the capabilities forming the governance middl eware are 
described. In a first time, the core and non specifi c infrastructure are Ii ted and their 
purposes in the current context explained. Subsequentl y, the key in fra tnlctur that 
are the profile management capabilities are described in more detail. 
3.4.1. Core infrastructure capabilities 
The core capabilities are the working base of the model as they each provide peci fi c 
functionalities that are necessary to the execution of either all or part of the 
governance. 
Following is the list of the governance model core infrastructures and their ba ic 
properties. It is noticeable that all these capabilities, are not specific to the governance 
anatomy. Therefore, describing them m details is out of the scope of thi current 
investigation. 
User interface: the user interface is a set of capabilities that allow users (e.g. 
administrator, other system) to access parts or all functionalities of the governance 
middleware. 
Access control: An access control infrastructure is used in order to check 
authorization. It generally consists of a specialised service that checks security 
assertions against access control requests . This is typically achieved through the use 
of access control policies and security assertions written in specialised grammar such 
as XACML [60] or SecPAL [61]. 
The role of the access control capability in the governance anatomy is to ensure end to 
end control of the massages' content access . 
Identity management: The role of the identity broker is to allow users to identify 
themselves. Authentication of the entity that acts as user is indeed a key a pect of 
SOA where different domains (e.g. companies, branches) will interoperate. Thi is 
generally accomplished by using security tokens. Depending on their anatomie , 
security infrastructure capabilities can provide both access control and identity 
management. 
The role of the identity management infrastructure is to ensure that the different 
capabilities and users are indeed who they claim to be. 
Message interceptor: The message broker, often called the mediator acts as an 
intermediary between two points. It can receive messages from multiple destinations 
determine the correct destination and route the message to appropriate channels. ' 
The role of the message broker is to allow the exposure governance infrastructure to 
be seamlessly placed between the business capability and its client. Additionally, the 
message broker allows the deployment of context based routing in order to assign the 
relevant profile to a specific context. 
Event notification engine: This capability allows infrastructures to send notifications 
about a change in their states. For instance if a policy is changed, all capabilities that 
depend from it will be informed. 
The role of the event notification capability is to allow different infrastructures to 
learn about a change of state and update their own behaviour accordingly. 
Metadata repository: Often referred to as a policy store or simply a repository, the 
role of this infrastructure is to allow storing metadata such as policies, taxonomies or 
ontology. Together with the service registry, this is the most commonly found element 
in existing governance solution. 
Policy management: The policy management is a set of capabilities that allow 
manipulating policies (e.g. apply metrics, detect and resolve conflicts). The author 
assumes that policy management capabilities are provided and their specific 
characteristics are left opened. Policy management is a complex topic in itself that is 
investigated in both academia and industry. Throughout this document, as stated in 
section 3.2.2, policies are meant as statements that define and constraint some aspect 
of a capability's behaviour. 
Service registry: The service registry is a repository where Web services are listed. 
On production of their credential, users and systems can then discover the services 
which are potentially organised in different categories. 
Service management: Service management comprises a set of capabilities that allow 
manipUlating (e.g. configure, instantiate) services and when relevant their instances. 
3.4.2. Profile management infrastructure capabilities 
The management model supports the interactions between the different elements of 
the infrastructure. The main elements of this layer are the user interface, the profile 
management, policy management and the service management services. In this 
section, the author will describe the profile management and define its links with the 
user interface, policy and service management capabilities. 
Profile management: Profile management represents the key element of this research. 
It aims at allowing the administration of profiles life-cycles and connects to the other 
services in order to so. This is done to guarantee that profiles are defined, enabled, 
monitored and disabled when relevant in agreement to user's needs and 
infrastructures requirements. 
Fi.gure 23 pre~ents a top level view of the profil e management infra tructure tOg lh r 
Wlt~ the u~er m~erface, m~nagement infrastructures, registry and repo ito alon; wilh 
their relatIOnships. On thiS figure , it can observed that through the u er interfa e a 
user can define a profile .an? specify a context. This data is then ent to the profil 
management ~hat stores It m the meta data repository. When re levant, the p lic ' 
management mfrastructure performs tasks related to poli cies ucb a indicatino and 
fixing inconsistencies. The profile management is also connected to th ;f\'i e 
management, which enables tasks related to capabili ty selection and u aoe. Th 
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Figure 23. Architectural diagram of the governance framework - interactions at design time 
In the following paragraphs the components related to profile management are 
described in more detail. 
Profile initiator: The first step of the profile management is to translate the ex terna l 
request, received from the user interface, into the grammar used internall y by the 
components described in section 3.3. This flexibility in terms of language is mean t to 
bring an increase level of adaptability towards specific domains or types of users. 
In order to allow for different grammars to be used, this component is based on the 
abstract factory pattern [67]. The factory proposes a set of di fferent functions that are 
implemented by the instances and profile specific implementation fo r each ca e. 
Using services allows improving the flexibility of the system by permitting ph ical 
distribution as well as reuse of existing software. 
The expected core fun ctions of the profi le initi ator capability are illu trated in Fioure 
24. 0 
«interface» 
Profile initiator 
+CRUDProfile(in profileJepresentation, out acknowledgement ) 
+CRUDContext(in context representation, out acknowledgement ) 
+CRUDContextSelector(in context selector representation, out acknowledgement) 
Figure 24. Profile initi ator int erface desc r iption 
All the functions on thi s component (Create, Read, Update Delete profile. context 
and context selector) allow external users (e.g. human adm inistrator, other go ernanc 
system) to interact with the documents holding the governance data . 
Figure 25 illustrates how the fac tory pattern can be used in order to pro ide uppOl1 
for natural language processing, an abstract profile grammar and a profile nam r id 
selection query system. 
10 
Profile 10 
G~marspe . 
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Figure 25. M anagement interface overview 
Profile composition : The profile composition engine selects the infra tructure 
capabilities according to the requirement given by the initiator. The component works 
recursively to deal with dependencies . At different stages of the infrastructure profi le 
life cycle, this engine will select infrastructures at di fferent levels of abstraction, more 
abstract (e.g. category in the taxonomy) at the beginning and more concrete (e.g. Web 
service) towards the enactment stage. 
The core functions of the profile composition capability are illustrated in Figure 26. 
<<in terface» 
Profile composition 
+composeAbstractProfile(in profileJeference, out abstractyrofileJeference) 
+composeConcreteProfile(in abstractyrofile, out conctreteyrofile_reference) 
+verifyProfile(in profileJeference, out acknowledgement) 
+bindProfile(in profile reference, in context reference, out acknowledgement) 
Figure 26. Profile composition interface desc rip tio n 
The compose abstract profile function pennits the definition of a complete and safe 
profile at the abstract level (e.g. without the concrete services). This process is further 
described in 3.5.1,3.5.2 and 3.5.3. 
The compose concrete profile function serves the same purpose as its abstract 
counterpart but with the selection of concrete services that enact the infrastructure 
capabilities required. This process is further described in 3.5.4 and 3.5.5. Given the 
sequential nature of the profile composition process it is possible that an abstract 
profile cannot be composed into a concrete one. This may occur when no service 
implementation is available to enact a service type described in the abstract process. 
In this case, mediation over the nature of the abstract process and whether it can be 
modified has to take place between the Business Capability owner and the 
Contextualisation Governance provider. 
The verify profile function allows to go through the elements (e.g. dependencies, 
usage policy) fonning the profile in order to insure the completeness and safety of 
execution. 
Finally, bind profile is the function that connects the profile to the business capability 
whose exposure it manages. 
Profile composition management: When the composition engine has deemed a 
profile to be complete, with no gap in the data flow, this one is sent to the profile 
composition management. Upon reception, this one starts creating the profile 
coordination plan to be able to manage the different infrastructures together. 
The core functions of the profile composition capability are illustrated in Figure 27. 
<<interface» 
Profile composition management 
+composeAbstractCoordinationPlan(in profile_reference, out coordinationylanJeference) 
+composeConcreteCoordinationPlan(in profile reference, out coordinationylan reference) 
Figure 27. Profile composition management interface description 
The compose abstract coordination plan builds the coordination plan at the abstract 
level. 
Compose concrete coordination is its counterpart at the concrete level. 
Profile life-cycle management: The life-cycle management supervises the profile life-
cycle. It contacts the composition engine management when it's been infonned that a 
profile is ready to be instantiated (by the management counterpart) and according to 
the up time agreement, requires the composition management to start the instantiation 
according to the coordination process built by the profile composition management. 
Additionally, the life-cycle management can request update(s) from the composition 
engine when necessary (e.g. service not adequate anymore, etc). 
The core functions of the profile composition capability are illustrated in Figure 28. 
«interface» 
Profile life-cycle management 
+activateProfile(in profileJeference, out acknowledgement) 
+deactivateProfile(in profile_reference, out acknowledgement) 
+enactProfile(in profile reference, out deployedyrofile reference) 
Figure 28. Profile life-cycle management interface description 
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Activate profile allows to ~tart and register the status of an exposition logic, deactivate 
profile enforces the OpposIte. Both ~f these functions should assume that the profile is 
ready to be used and expose the busmess capability when called. 
The enact profile function is called in order to the finalise the instantiation and 
exposed the profile enhanced business capability. 
Profile selector: When relevant, the profile selector chooses the relevant profile using 
a set of given parameters. Typically, the parameter is the context, however different 
cases can arise when the profile selector can request the life-cycle management to 
verify the profile and react accordingly. This separation of concern between the 
profile selector and the life cycle management and the fact that the profile selector 
advises its life-cycle counterpart, allows for different selection mechanisms that can 
specialised according to data and environment. 
For instance, when an event specifying that an used policy has been changed in an 
infrastructure capability is triggered, the selector can then decide what profile it 
should ask the life-cycle management to review first. This selection could be based on 
how much resource (e.g. network, number of infrastructures involved) the different 
active profiles use, for performance reason, or what is the SLA with the different 
users involved. 
The core functions of the profile composition capability are illustrated in Figure 29. 
«interface» 
Profile selector 
+se/ectProfile(in contexLreference, out ackno/edgement) 
+se/ectProfile(in parameter, out ackno/edgement) 
Figure 29. Profile selector interface description 
Both select profile function of the profile selector infrastructure allow deciding on 
what particular profile is relevant. In the top example, the context is used to make the 
selection. 
3.4.2.1. Service management requirements 
Service management infrastructures are less commonly encountered pieces of 
infrastructure than their policy management counterparts. In this regard, the author 
felt it necessary to define the key requirements and expectations from the exposition 
governance point of view. 
As underlined in section 3.2.1 in the definition of the concepts, capabilities are 
expected to be manageable when relevant (i.e. when it is sensible for configuration, 
performance or security reason). 
The capability management component should be comprised of a) a capability 
instance factory, b) a capability selector factory and c) a capability management 
factory. These three elements respect the abstract software factory pattern in order to 
allow for a more flexible support of additional types of capabilities. 
The management and instance factory elements are used to configure (e.g. setup with 
context aware policy) and/or replicate a capability (e.g. copy service onto another 
server). The latter is particularly useful for infrastructure capabilities that may have to 
deal with heavy workloads (e.g. included in many or demanding profile instances) or 
different requirements (e.g. a Service Level Agreement could necessitate high 
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availability) . The management interface takes advantage of a management la er of a 
service, typically implemented using WS-DM [68] , in order to configure the aid 
service. This is also useful for infrastructures such as security service which requir 
some sort of interaction and configuration before they can be used. 
The selection factory allows selecting capabilities according to specific characteri tic 
and grammars. 
In Figure 30, the three function s previously introduced are illu trated along two 
examples of factories for each. The capability instance factory is implemented in two 
different manners, one making use of the Apache Muse [69] soft\ are the other on 
indicating that capabilities provided through it cannot be instantiated. The capability 
selector instances drawn suggest that a QoS based and a u er experience ba ed 
selections are available . Finally, the manager factory illustrate the choice bet\ een a 
WS-DM and custom based remote capability management. 
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Figure 30. Service management overview 
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3.4.3.Summary of the components descriptions 
Profile management is di vided into two main logical domains, the profile con renc), 
management and the profile life-cycle management. 
These domains can be respectively sp lit in several steps: defining the infra tructure 
capabilities, the policy templates, the service dependencies and the information flow 
for the first one and defining the profile management process as v ell as publi hing the 
infrastructure profile for the second. 
The first aim of the profile management is to manage the life-cycle of the profile . 
This consists in allowing the profile to be defined, instantiated maintained acce ible, 
updated and deleted. 
In addition to the profile instance 's life-cycle management an important ta k that i 
attributed to the profile manager is to handle the adaptability of the profile in tanc . 
This feature is needed to allow for an efficient interchange between the infra tructure 
used. 
Additionally, together with the policy management infrastructure, th e rol of the 
profile management is to detenninate the best poss ible way to achie e th e profile in 
the context requested . The deci sion maki ng proce s i ba ed on the requirement 
given by the user, the capabi lities held by the system along with th ir a ocia ted 
constraints and the infOlmation contained in the context. The degree of automation f 
this activity is directly related to the quality of the data held in the other cor element 
as introduced before. 
The principal components of the profile management are illustrated in Figure 31. 
Please refer to Figure 23 to see the external connections . On thi fi gure, the main 
expected fu nctionalities of the serv ice and policy management are illu trated . 
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Figure 31. Profile management overview 
This distribution of roles and the potential hierarchical anatomy of the model is meant 
to reflect the unreliable nature of distributed systems where components. here 
infrastructure capabilities, are provided by third parties and may not be always 
available or present in the same state. 
In this section, the author described the infrastructure capabilities forming the 
exposure governance architecture. The roles of these infrastructures and their 
communication interfaces have been defined. In the next section, the governance 
processes that allow the infrastructures to work together are explained. 
3.5. Processes anatomy 
In the previous section, the author described the infrastructure capabilities forming the 
exposure governance architecture. In this section, the governance processes that allow 
the infrastructures to work together are explained. 
The steps that lead to the creation of a safe and sound infrastructure profile are listed 
in the following paragraphs along with the components they involve. Concrete 
examples illustrating all the steps are shown in chapter 4 on implementation. 
3.5.1. Define infrastructure capability 
The first phase of the life-cycle is to gather all the information available about each 
infrastructure type listed in the profile formed by the profile initiator. 
This task is enacted by the profile composition infrastructure capability and only 
targets infrastructures that are explicitly mentioned in the profile description 
document. 
This phase is typically activated by the profile life-cycle management infrastructure 
upon reception of a request from the profile selector. In the case where the availability 
of the profile is specified to be permanent, the profile life-cycle manager is sent a 
request for profile activation upon the submission of a profile and of its associated 
context and context selector by the profile initiator. 
This phase is divided in four steps as follows (steps illustrated in Figure 32): 
1. Define service description: in the taxonomy used to categorise infrastructures, 
this corresponds to the type. The operation is repeated for each capability in 
the profile. 
2. Define capability policy scheme: this information is held in the constraints of 
the infrastructure type. 
3. Define capability usage policy: this information is held in the constraints for 
the data flow part. 
4. Define capability management process: this information is held in the 
management plan. 
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Figure 32. UML sequence diagram of the define infrastructure capability governance process 
All this data is supplied within the profile description taxonomy depicted in section 
3.3.1. This taxonomy is strictly based on the requirements of this research. The author 
takes into account that more advanced description techniques such as ontology based 
ones could be used. However complex the description is, these four basic steps remain 
and would be subdivided in more technology specific ones. 
It is assumed that the infrastructure providers have registered their infrastructures 
correctly. 
3.5.2. Define policy templates 
The second phase aims at getting more information about each infrastructure's type 
policy templates and how to manage them. Amongst this information, the meta-data 
transformations specify how to translate data from different grammars and policy 
types into this particular type. 
This step is also performed by the policy composition capability when composing a 
profile (stages illustrated in Figure 33). 
5. Select capability: the operation is repeated for each capability in the profile. 
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6. Define policy template: the policy templates are held as constraints in the 
capability descriptions when relevant. 
7. Define domain of meta-data transformations (i/o meta-data): this step looks 
into the data flow of this activity in the profile description and define if a 
transformation is required. 
8. Define policy management processes: when a transformation is required, the 
profile composition looks for such transformation in the infrastructure 
repository. This is achieved by looking at the data flows and usage of the 
infrastructures registered as translators. Upon selection of the appropriate 
translation infrastructure, this one is inserted accordingly in the profile. 
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Figure 33. UML sequence diagram of the define policy templates governance process 
In a similar manner as in the previous stage on infrastructure type definition, this data 
is provided by the profile taxonomy when infrastructures are regis.tered. Based on ~he 
level of complexity of the semantics used in an implementa~I~n, transformatlO.n 
strategies could be generated by the policy management capabIhty. H~wever, thIS 
level of automation is both potentially complex and resource demandmg and the 
61 
author assumes that it is more realistic for the translations to be pro\·ided as 
infrastructure capabilities. 
3.5.3. Define infrastructure capability dependencies 
Once all the infrastructure types provided in the profile request have been defined and 
their policies identified, the profile composition engine verifies if the profile is safe 
and complete. In order to achieve this, this capability works recursively and identifies 
potential gaps in the data flows and infrastructure usages. The capability management 
process and usage policy are parsed and check for consistency against the other 
infrastructure capabilities present in the profile at this stage. For instance, if an access 
control capability type is present at this stage, depending on its anatomy, it may 
require an external identity management infrastructure. In this case, this relationship 
would be present in the usage or management policies of the specific access control 
capability category. The stages forming this step are illustrated in Figure 34. 
9. Select infrastructure capabilities: the operation is repeated for each capability 
in the profile. 
10. Define operation bindings: at this stage, the data flow is checked, the data 
should pass from a capability's operation into another operation without any 
gap. If a gap is detected, the missing operation is looked after and the profile 
composition capability goes through steps 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. 
11. Define capability invocation pattern: for each operation registered in the 
profile, when relevant, an invocation pattern is available and defines what 
potential other operation would need to be invoked before it. This type of data 
is stored as a constraint when the infrastructure is registered and defines it 
behaviour. If a dependency is detected, it is looked after and the profile 
composition capability goes through steps 3.5.1 and 3.5.2. 
12. Validate capability dependencies: for each step in the profile this stage checks 
ifboth steps 10 and 11 defined above are fulfilled. 
62 
e~file composijjon . I 
comJlOseAbstraC1Proflle [se=a~n!·1 
I I 
I 
I 
~ select infrastructure capability I I 
define operation bindings 
retu ms operation bindings 
~-A------------------
0 .... 
define rrjssing operation 
I 
I 
retums ITissing operation reference 
~--------- ___________ L ____________ 
I 
define capability invocation pattern 
returns capability invocation pattern 
~--r----------------
{} I..-
define ITisslng capability 
" I 
I 
returns ITissing capability reference ~ ____________________ L _____________ 
I 
I 
I > validate capability dependencies I I 
I 
I 
'-
-I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
..L. 
'-.J 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Figure 34. UML sequence diagram of the define service dependencies governance process 
Following step twelve, the profile IS stored and deemed safe and complete at an 
abstract level by the governance. 
3.5.4. Define information flow 
At this stage specific services enacting the infrastructure capability categories listed in 
the profile are selected. Additionally, the manner in which these services are 
aggregated and the transformations needed in order for the relevant data to pass from 
one to another are confirmed and validated. 
13. Select infrastructure capabilities: the concrete service implementing the 
infrastructure required in the profile is sought. 
14. Define policy meta-data transformations: the meta-data transformation 
specific to the service are resolved in the same manner as defined in section 
3.5.2. It is noticeable here that according to how the semantics describing the 
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profile and the potential infrastructure forming it are defined, this stage could 
be useless. 
15. Validate policy dependencies: in the same manner as the previous stage for 
meta-data transformation, this stage looks into dependency validation specific 
to the service as 3.5.3 at the infrastructure category level. 
By step fifteen, the profile is a set of defined and ordered infrastructure capabilities 
along with their specific management plans. 
3.5.5. Define profile management processes 
With a complete list of what services will allow enacting the profile, the profile 
composition management capability attempts to order the management processes and 
define an implementation strategy, named coordination process, which orders the 
operations needed in order to create the profile instance. 
16. Select service management processes: for each service, the profile 
composition management infrastructure gather the management plan. 
17. Select policy management processes: in a system where policies are managed 
through defined and enforceable management processes, the later are also 
obtained. 
18. Define coordination process: the different services management plans are 
correlated and duplicates when they exist are removed. 
19. Bind management processes & coordination process: the coordination plan 
document is assembled. 
20. Validate dependencies: finally, the coordination plan is checked for 
completeness. 
Upon completion of the coordination process, the different management processes are 
attached to it at their relevant positions. Following this, the profile instance is sent 
back to the composition engine for validation. 
Step twenty signifies that the profile is complete at the concrete level; it contains 
information related to what services will be used, how to configure them and how to 
pass data from one operation to the next. In this state, it only lacks contextual data to 
render it operational as required. 
These steps are summarised in Figure 35, where the transformation of profile into 
profile instance with specific services fulfilling the infrastructure capabilities can be 
visualised. 
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Figure 35. Infrastructure profil e crea tion 
Once a profil e is complete at the concrete level, the next stage i the in tant latlon . 
Finall y, the business capability can be enhanced with the in tantiated profi le and 
exposed. Thi s separation of logic insures that a profi le can be reu ed with different 
services. Additi onall y, the enhanced service is onl y used in the particular context that 
is relevant to its specific users. 
Once a profil e has been va lidated (c.f. steps from one to twenty) , it can be used in 
order to allow the exposition of a business capabili ty. The fo ll owing tep define thi s 
process. 
3.5.6. Select infrastructure profile instance 
The first stage of the business capabili ty exposure sees the profile selector component 
choosing the relevant profil e instance. The selector then contacts the profile life-cycle 
management, which upon receiving the request of business capability exposure, 
requires the profil e composition engine to define how the capability and profile 
instance work together. The stages forming this step are illustrated in Figure 36. 
1. Discover infrastructure profiles: this step makes use of the context and 
context selector to find the relevant profi le(s) associated with the targeted 
exposure. 
2. Select infrastructure profile(s) : the relevant profi le is selected. 
3. Defin e bindings to business capability: the goal of this step is to define how 
the business capability will be linked to the instantiated profile. Concretely, 
the data flow between the business capability and the profile needs to be 
completed . 
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4. Valid~te servi~e depende'.'cies: The previous step that looked into how to 
ope~atIOn~lly hnk the ?~smess capability to the profile may have necessitate 
the ~~clu~IOn of an addItIOnal set of capabilities. This step insures that this new 
addItIon IS safely made. 
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Figure 36. UML sequence diagram of the select infrastructure profile instance governance 
process 
Due to the relatively unreliable nature of such a large scale distributed system where 
different entities provide components it is necessary to insure that the profile is still 
complete and can still be instantiated. 
3.5.7. Defi ne service-specific policies 
Steps five to seven allow the profile composition engine to refine the different 
policies with the business capability data when relevant. This is the first step towards 
the contextualisation of the profile. 
5. Select infrastructure capability: This step is repeated for each infrastructure in 
the profile. 
6. Refine policy template: Existing templates are instantiated with contextual 
data found in the context document. 
7. Update service policies: The previously filled template is then pushed to the 
service through its management interface when relevant. 
3.5.8. Define information flow 
The same actions are then taken with the transformation strategies in the next three 
steps. This is made to insure that the transformations are adequate and match the filled 
templates. 
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8. Select infrastructure capabilities: This step is repeated for each infrastructure 
in the profile. For perfonnance reason, an implementation could here decide to 
only take capabilities where translations are required into account. 
9. Refine policy meta-data transformations: The existing transformation 
template is here refined with context specific transformation logic. 
10. Validate policy dependencies: Once again, the profile is checked for 
completeness and safety. For perfonnance reason, an implementation can 
decide to either skip this step or target the specific infrastructures that the 
previous step 9 looked into. 
3.5.9. Define service exposure management processes 
This phase defines how the profile enhanced business capability is going to be 
exposed. The goal is to identify the chronological list of actions that need to take 
place in order for the service exposure to take place in a safe manner. 
11. Select profile management processes: All the management processes are here 
selected again. 
12. Select business capability management processes: the same is done for the 
management processes relevant to the business capability. 
13. Define coordination process: The coordination is validated and completed 
when a gap in the data flow in found. 
14. Bind management processes & coordination process: At this stage, the 
business capability management processes are included in the profile 
coordination. 
15. Validate dependencies: The latest stage may have introduced new 
infrastructures or translations, the dependencies are therefore validated along 
with the overall data flow of the exposition logic management process. 
3.5.10. Publish service instance 
Finally, the coordination plan is executed, the different infrastructure configured and 
their bindings is done. Additionally, policy stores are updated and the business 
capability, now enhanced with the appropriate NFPs, is published. 
16. Update capability policy stores: The goal of this stage is to update policy 
stores with contextualised versions of the templates when relevant. 
17. Update infrastructure bindings: During this phase, the specific bindings for 
each service enacting an infrastructure capability is defined and updated. 
18. Expose profile enhanced business capability to service endpoint: The 
instantiated profile and the business capability are exposed as a service. 
19. Publish service: Finally, the enhanced business capability exposed though the 
instantiated profile is advertised as relevant and awaiting traffic. 
The process of refining the policies with the contextual data and the exposition of the 
governed business capability are illustrated end the profile managem~nt. These s~~ps 
that allow contextualising the profile and publishing the enhanced busmess capabilIty 
are summarised in Figure 37. 
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Summary of processes anatomy 
The fo ur main stages of the governance li fe -cycle are ill ustrated in Figure 38 . In tage 
one, the profile is prepared and made ready to use in a specific contex t. At tage two 
the business capability and exposition context requirements and conditi on are 
inspected and prepared. Later on, at stage three the profile is refined and adapted to a 
specific exposition context. Finally, the instantiated profile and busines capabil ity are 
bound together and exposed to users . 
The proposed approach divides the governance process in logical tep which are 
enacted by specialised components. This permits increasing th e fl ex ibility and 
reusability of the exposition logic as well as supporting the hi gh level of di tributi on 
of the infrastructure as a service paradigm. 
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3.6. Usage patterns 
In this section, the different situations the architecture described in the pre iou 
sections can be used in are presented. Segregation is made between the deployment 
options for the deployment of the infrastructures fonning the governance middleware 
and the usage of the governance i tsel f. 
3.6.1.lnfrastructure capabilities deployment patterns 
The core capabi lities deployment patterns define how these capabilities are phy ically 
deployed. This impacts the governance middleware in tenns of perfonnance, ea e of 
maintenance and accessibility for the capability provi ders. 
Distributed pattern : In this pattern, the infrastructures are distributed over the 
network. This pattern is used in the Virtual music store scenario presented in section 
4.2 .1. 
Hub and spoke pattern : In order to reduce potential network latency or insure that 
the physical location of the governance middleware is suitable for the workload it is 
meant to handle, it is possible to deploy the core infrastructures at the same location. 
Standalone pattern: The stand alone pattern encompasses that all infrastructures 
potentially used in the governance are at the same location. This pattern can be 
required when the context requires that the traffic network be minimal. 
These patterns can be applied in an assorted manner. For instance, an environment 
where the security related infrastructures are going to know of be very demanding 
could take advantage of having only these specific capabilities deployed in a 
standalone or hub and spoke pattern, with the rest of the infrastructures distributed 
over the network. 
3.6.2. Governance middleware deployment patterns 
Governance patterns identify who has ownership of the go ernance middle are 
configuration, the responsibility to monitor events and transaction characteri tic and 
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therefore who defines and authorizes changes to the existing mjddleware. In add ition. 
this defines who decides when and in what conditions new infrastructure ervice can 
be added. 
The patterns described in the following paragraphs are derived from studying how 
other pieces of middleware such as brokers, message queues or Enterprise Service 
Buses (ESBs) are deployed and used. 
Approaches to governance middleware deployment patterns range from internal to 
federated: 
Internal governance: All the interactions requiring governance may lie \ ho ll 
within the organisation's perimeter and not be accessible from out ide of it. For 
example, a single entity may span over several sites or country where each area u e 
different software with different transport protocols or interface style . 
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Figure 39. Internal governance pattern 
Perimeter governance: All business capabilities lying within one organi sation a~e 
made accessible to other organisations through the governance mlddleware. ThIS 
situation may arise when an organisation wants to leverage on the governance 
middleware to expose its business capabilities to potentia.1 partner~ in a more flex Ible 
manner than internally. This pattern is the one used 10 the Vutual MUSIC Store 
scenario in section 4.2. 
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Figure 40. Perimeter governance pattern 
Shared governance: The business capabilities for whjch interaction are go emed 
belong to cooperating organisation that share the governance midd leware. 
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Figure 41. Shared governance pattern 
Federated governance: In thi s pattern the organisations governance middleware are 
federated. The interactions between business capabilities inside of this federation can 
take advantage of the collaboration between the governance middleware. 
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Figure 42. Federated governance pattern 
71 
These patterns can be applied as such, but they can also be mixed with one another. 
For instance, an organisation could use the internal governance pattern within its 
perimeter and the perimeter pattern to expose by default its business capabilities. The 
same organisation could still choose to make use of both shared and federated 
governance patterns for specific situations or partners. 
3.7. Summary of the anatomy 
In this section, the concrete architecture for governance of safe and flexible 
contextualisation of resources for SOA governance was presented. Firstly, the author 
defined the main concepts necessary to the good understanding of the anatomy's 
description. Next, the data structures used in the concrete architecture were presented. 
Then, the components forming the architecture were described and categorised in 
either a core or a management category. Finally, the processes that link these different 
data structures and components were shown. Additionally, the governance 
architecture usage patterns were briefly described. 
In the chapter 4, the author will describe how the architecture presented in this chapter 
was implemented in a concrete example of virtual music store as presented in chapter 
1.1.1. 
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4. Implementation 
governance 
of resource contextualisation 
This chapter describes the implementation of the concrete architecture for resource 
contextualisation governance in SOA defined in Chapter 3. The implementation is 
used in the context of a Virtualised Music Store as presented in 1.1.1. Finally, a series 
of tests are performed on the functional validity of the implementation and the results 
are discussed. 
The use of the resource exposure governance is essentially seamless. The resource 
owner or the governance middleware administrator, depending on how the 
responsibilities are shared, is responsible for inspecting when governance requests 
(e.g. profIles) are sensible or can be a threat to the governed resource's integrity (e.g. 
conflicting business goal, inadequate security). Additionally, the only significant 
supplementary effort, in comparison of not using any NFP support for the governed 
resource, is the provision of adequately described infrastructure capabilities. This is 
alleviated by the fact that infrastructure providers will want to expose their services in 
order, for instance, to generate revenue. 
The objective of this implementation is to implement a Virtual Music Store connected 
to content providers. In this scenario, the role of the governance middleware is to 
allow seamlessly connect content providers that are using different security settings. 
4. 1. Governance middleware 
This section provides a brief overview of relevant aspects of Web Service 
development with the Java language [70] and the Apache Axis2 [71] SOAP [72] and 
WSDL [33] engine that has been chosen as the demonstrator platform for 
implementation of resource contextualisation middleware services. Nevertheless, as is 
apparent from the following discussion, the general approach to development of the 
middleware is neither Axis2 nor Java specific. 
The Apache Axis2 engine deployed on an Apache Tomcat [73] application server was 
chosen because it provides straightforward mechanisms for developing, deploying and 
using Web Services. It is also a widely used platform with which to experiment. 
Each core infrastructure capability was developed, deployed and then registered in the 
registry using the same registration data as the none core infrastructure capabilities 
described further (c.f. Table 5 for example of infrastructure registration data). This 
approach was used to allow sharing the same code to discover and enact all the 
capabilities. 
The registry itself was provided by an instance of the eXist-db Open Source Native 
XML Database [74] which natively exposes the data it holds through a SOAP 
interface provided by a servlet [75] mode based on Apache Axis. In addition, this web 
enabled XML database can be queried using XQuery 1.0 [76] or XPath 2.0 [77]. All 
these elements permit an effIcient and straightforward manipUlation of XML data 
over the network. 
Finally, the message interceptor was provided by Apache Synapse [78]. This cho~ce 
was driven by the relatively well documented usage of this project, its undemandmg 
development and deployment requirements. In addition, the implementation required 
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a relatively efficient message broker as all the messages in the scenario were going to 
pass through it. 
4.2. Virtual music store scenario 
4.2.1. Description 
This section presents the virtual music store (VMS) scenario introduced in section 
1.1.1. This presentation is a practical illustration of the concrete architecture proposed 
in chapter 3. The security governance gateway presented intercepts messages 
addressed to a VMS, enforces security policies and integrates the defmed security 
capabilities (e.g. identity management, authorization service) in order to secure the 
VMS communications with its content providers. 
With this scenario, the author aims to demonstrate that the concrete architecture 
presented in section 3 can be applied to provide complex NFPs such as access control, 
identity management and policy enforcement. Indeed, these security-related NFPs 
necessitate configuration of the capabilities themselves, but also between them. For 
instance, in a certain federation anatomy, a Secure Token Service (STS) [54] 
providing identity management will not only need to be configured, but will also 
require a process of trust establishment with the different STSs it is meant to interact 
with. The situation can be different in different federation anatomies, thus 
necessitating a tight management of how to control the assembly of capabilities in a 
safe manner. 
4.2.2. Partners and roles 
In this scenario, the aggregated services are virtual music stores serving specialised 
markets or communities of interest. The basic content providers include copyright 
owners of musical recordings or their representatives who make these recordings 
available online. The virtual music store reaches agreement with content providers 
enabling it to act as re-seller of bundles of recordings from their catalogues. The VMS 
is a VO consisting of the music store operator that communicates to content providers 
through a security governance gateway whose security services are provided by 
external security providers through the SaaS (Security as a Service) paradigm. 
The end customer of the VMS will be a member of the public. What they will see is a 
web site where they will be able to search for tracks. The user interface of the VMS 
setup for the implementation is presented in Figure 43. 
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As shown in Figure 44, in the music store scenario, the main categorie of partner 
are: 
Virtual MusicStore 
Organisation ~ 
I 
. - . - . - . _ . - ,, -
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perimeter ; 
SomeMusicStore RockYourWorld Store I ILoveMyClassics Sto re 
Figure 44. Virtual music store scenario with security governance gateway 
Content Provider (CP): The CP is a stakeholder of the ro le music content pro ider 
as described in chapter 1.1.1. It is a specialist content provider (e.g. record label or 
other copyright owners). Three different content providers take part in thi s particular 
scenario. Each one of them is using a different security profi le that it shares ith the 
VMS operator through the security governance gateway. The security profiles ex pre 
their requirements in tenn of security in a set of XML fi les using the fonnali ed v ay 
illustrated in Figure 19. Following is the list of the content providers with an overview 
of their security settings: 
• 
• 
• 
CP1, "Some~usicStore" requires HTTP digest access authentication [80]. 
CP1 s profile IS fully presented in Table 11. 
CP2 "RockYourWorldStore" requires SecPAL for both expressing the access 
control requests and identify the requesters. 
CP3 "ILoveMyClassicsStore" requires login and password with its own xml 
schema for the token. 
These three profiles have been selected as they represent the main approaches to 
securing resource access in distributed systems and present three level of difficulty in 
term of integration and contextualisation support. 
HTTP Digest access authentication is a common way of controlling resources access 
in internet oriented software. It requires the exchange of data such as user name, 
password, nonce and Quality of Protection (QoP) and is none trivial. It does 
necessitate the deployment of a specific infrastructure capability to support it (c.f. 
Table 6). Because it is complex and yet does not require a lot of content (e.g. message 
payload) to demonstrate, this profile will be used in the rest of this section to illustrate 
the scenario. 
SecPAL is used for expressing decentralised authorization policies. It is similar to 
XACML in that it uses a set of subject, resource and action to define access control 
rules and requests. Both technologies can be used together with WS-Trust [82] 
standard. WS-Trust defines a trust model together with how to issue, renew and 
cancel tokens that are used to identify users. This method for identifying user is 
common in SOA. 
The third method used to test the usability and efficiency of the architecture proposed 
uses a custom made xml schema to pass user credentials in the message header. 
Although this manner is not recommended, it presents with the opportunity to test a 
simple contextualisation in term of infrastructure support needed. 
Security governance provider: The security governance provider is a particular 
stakeholder of the value adding service provider as described in chapter 1.1.1 that 
provides the assembly and management of other value adding services. This role 
involves providing the VMS with a security governance gateway. The purpose of the 
gateway is to hide the technical complexity of the security middleware involved and 
enhance the visibility of the security actions that need to be enforced. In addition, it 
allows connecting the VMS to different content providers that expose their catalogs 
using diverse security configurations. 
Virtual Music Store (VMS) operator: The VMS is a stakeholder of the virtual 
music store operator as described in chapter 1.1.1. Ultimately, the administrator of the 
VMS is responsible for selecting its different CPs partners. 
Security as a Service (Sa as) provider: The SaaS provider is a stakeholder of the 
value adding service provider as described in chapter 1.1.1. This is a third party 
entrusted with providing a security service such as identity management, access 
control or audit. These services are managed by the security governance and allow the 
content providers and music store operator to leverage on the security governance 
gateway to enhance their interoperability while keeping the necessaI?' level of 
security. In this experiment, these services, shown in Figure 44 are registered and 
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described using the same taxonomy as the one used in the security profile. lthough 
these providers are not known from the VMS and CPs, for the sake of lhi 
experiment, it is assumed that these actors trust the security go emance provider \ ho 
in tum trusts the security service providers. The author belie es that in a producti on 
environment this would be overcome by providing solutions such a QoS [ 3] or 
dynamic trust based [84] selection of services . 
4.2.3.S0A security governance 
In the music store scenario, an instance of the governance middle\ are named ecuri t 
governance is designed. 
Figure 45 illustrates how security capabi liti es can be compo ed into a ecurit 
management solution during service operation. In thi s fi gure, the cont xtual 
governance di scussed throughout this document is part of the SOA Security 
Governance Layer element. This solution intercepts messages addre sed to a t of 
resources, enforces security policies and integrate the defin ed core ecurit 
capabilities, such as identity brokerage, authori ation services or other managed 
security services in order to secure the resources' communicati on . 
It is noticeable that defining an independent enforcement layer (c.f. SO ecurit y 
Governance Layer on Figure 45) connected through messaging middleware to th e 
security capabilities that are governed by another dedicated layer implie an 
additional level of complexity. However this trade-off is compen ated by the ga in in 
flexibility, dynamicity and by all owing auditing of the results of each ac ti on 
separately if necessary. 
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Figure 45. SOA security governance overview 1811 
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4.2.4. Security governance life-cycle 
This section describes the life-cycle of the virtual music store's security. It starts \vith 
the governance gateway configuration then continues with the initial agreements and 
discovery of the potential partners which leads to the formation of a new VO. This is 
followed by the security profile management that allows for the verification and 
instantiation of the security profile given by content providers. Finally. the 
adaptability faculty of the virtual store infrastructure is introduced. 
Security governance gateway configuration. Prior to the VO formation and at any 
time during the following steps, the security governance gateway is meant to reach 
agreements with security service providers to use their services within a particular 
context (e.g. VO) and/or with specific requirements (e.g. QoS) in order to be able to 
provide security for the different content providers used by the VMS. In a production 
environment, these agreements could be reached through Quality of Service (QoS) 
based selection, commercial agreement after human or electronic negotiation. In our 
case, different services are added, included relevant ones. 
In the experiment presented, three infrastructure capabilities are registered as such in 
the service repository. The infrastructure are: two security related services including a 
HTTP digest authentication and a SecP AL Authorization as well as a logging service. 
The logging service keeps a track of the text sent to it, in a preconfigured collection. 
This logging infrastructure's registration data is shown in Table 5. The XML schema 
defining how capabilities can be registered is shown in Table 15. In this prototype, the 
same schema is used for registering the capabilities and expressing the profiles. 
In Table 5, the reader can see that the logging infrastructure capability posses two 
interfaces, including one for management purpose that allows the creation and 
removal of collections of logs. The other interface is defined for the actual 
functionality of logging. Both interfaces link the related WSDLs and their locations. It 
is noticeable that the functionalities are ordered through the use of the constraint 
"BeforeorAfter", allowing for automatic usage. 
<ws-p:Capability ID="ac06e340-6763-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66" xmlns:ws-p-"com.bt.ws-
profile"> 
<ws-p:name>Logging</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:lnterface ID="ac06e341-6763-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Management</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p: Functionality I D="8db9cd54-676b-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>CreateLogEntriesCollection</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint I D="f8fOb 7 c1-6764-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSDL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/Logginglnfrastructure/mgt</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
<ws-p:Functionality ID="9d940791-676b-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>RemoveLogEntriesCollection</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint ID="ac06e343-6763-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:BeforeorAfter>before</ws-p:BeforeorAfter> 
<ws-p:Activity>self:8db9cd54-676b-11 df-a08a-
78 
0800200c9a66</ws-p:Activity> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="a84e2761-676b-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/Logginglnfrastructure/mgt</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
</ws-p:lnterface> 
<ws-p: Interface I 0="ac06e342-6763-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Functionality Logging</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p: Functionality 10="d93e3051-676a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>CreateEntryLog</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="ac06e343-6763-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: Beforeor After>before</ws-p: BeforeorAfter> 
<ws-p:Activity>self:8db9cd54-676b-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66</ws-p:Activity> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="ac06e344-6763-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/Logginglnfrastructure/function</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="d93e3051-676a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>RemoveEntryLog</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="452efOb2-676b-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: Beforeor After>before</ws-p: Beforeor After> 
<ws-p:Activity>self:d93e3051-676a-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66</ws-p:Activity> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
<ws-p:Constraint 1 0="452efOb9-676c-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>W SOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/Logginglnfrastructure/function</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
</ws-p:1 nterface> 
</ws-p:Capability> 
Table 5. Registration data of logging infrastructure 
In Table 6, the HTTP digest authentication and decoding infrastructure capability is 
registered in much the same way. 
<ws-p:Capability I 0="218ee5e 1-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66" xmlns:ws-p-"com .bt. ws-
profile"> 
<ws-p:name>HTTP Digest Authz</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p: Interface I 0="218ee5e3-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Management User</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="218ee5e5-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>CreateUser</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="218ee5e7 -6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/HTTPOigestAuthzlUserMgt</ws-p:Location> 
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</ws-p: Constrai nt> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
</ws-p:lnterface> 
<ws-p: 1 nterface 1 0="5f913aO 1-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Functionality</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="5f913a03-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>ReadMessage</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="5f913a07 -6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: Beforeor After>before</ws-p: BeforeorAfter> 
<ws-p:Activity>self:218ee5e5-6836-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66</ws-p:Activity> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="5f913a05-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/HTTPOigestAuthzlFunction</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p: Constrai nt> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="639220c5-897d-4f52-8db4-5d03456d4eab"> 
<ws-p:name>GenerateHeader</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="5f913a05-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/HTTPOigestAuthzlFunction</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
</ws-p: Interface> 
</ws-p:Capability> 
Table 6. Registration data ofHTTP digest authentication and decoding infrastructure 
In Table 7, the SecPAL authorization infrastructure capability is registered in much 
the same way. 
<ws-p:Capability 10="6449fda1-6766-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66" xmlns:ws-p="com.bt.ws-
profile"> 
<ws-p:name>SecPAL Authz</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:lnterface 10="6449fda2-6766-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Management User</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="9b282ge5-682a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>CreateUser</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="ac06e343-6763-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: Beforeor After>before</ws-p: Beforeor After> 
<ws-p:Activity>self:6449fda3-6766-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66</ws-p:Activity> 
</ws-p: Constrai nt> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="93450270-6767-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/SecPAUUserMgt</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="9b282ge 7 -682a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>UpdateUser</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="93450270-6767-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"/> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="9b282ge9-682a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>OeleteUser</ws-p:name> 
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<ws-p:Co~straint 10 "93450270-6767-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"/> 
</ws-p:F unctlonahty> 
</ws-p: Interface> 
<ws-p:lnterface 10="6449fda3-6766-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Management Trust</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="029887b9-682a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Create T rust</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="95450273-6767-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>W SOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/SecPALlTrustMgt</ws_p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
<ws-p: Functionality I 0="9b282ge 1-682a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>OeleteTrust</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="95450273-6767-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"/> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
</ws-p:lnterface> 
<ws-p:lnterface I 0="644a24bO-6766-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>F unctionality T oken</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="029887b7 -682a-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66'> 
<ws-p:name>Create T oken</ws-p: name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="ac2088f1-6767 -11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: Beforeor After>before</ws-p: Beforeor After> 
<ws-p:Activity>self:6449fda2-6766-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66</ws-p :Activity> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="ac2088f4-6767 -11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSOL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:8080/SecPALlTokenMgt</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
<ws-p:Functionality 10="87d36ee1-682a-11df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: name>Evaluate T oken</ws-p: name> 
<ws-p:Constraint 10="ac2088f1-6767 -11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: Beforeor After>before</ws-p: Beforeor After> 
<ws-p:Activity>self:029887b9-682a-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66</ws-p:Activity> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
<ws-p:Constraint I 0="ac2088f4-6767 -11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"/> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
</ws-p:lnterface> 
</ws-p:Capability> 
Table 7. Registration data of SecP AL Authorization infrastructure 
VO formation. Prior to any collaborative task and once the virtual shop has decided 
to establish the music store, it needs to reach an agreement with the security 
governance provider. 
VO formation and management as such are out of the scope of the current work. 
However, the author uses a form of virtual context that supports the level of 
functionality required in order to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed concrete 
architecture. As suggested in section 5.4 on future works, collaborative governance 
spanning across multiple organisations and user domains of expertise should be 
investigated in the future. 
Therefore, in the current context, all negotiations between the different partners are 
meant to take place outside of the scope of the implementation. 
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With .a. ~overnance. gateway.in place, the VMS operator can register his business 
capabIhtIes. In thIS scenano, there is one business capability that h tw 
fu . 1·· 1) as 0 nctIOna ItIes consu~e music content (i.e. input point for content providers) 2) 
sen? req.uest for ~onte~t (1.e. search query to content providers). The data used for the 
regIstratIOn OfthiS busmess capability is shown in Table 8. 
<ws~p:Capability ID "8b73c250-6af7 -11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66" xmlns:ws-p="com.bt.ws-
profile"> 
<ws-p:name>VMS</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:lnterface ID="8b73c251-6af7 -11 df-a08a-OS00200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Functionality Read Content</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functionality ID="8b73c252-6af7 -11 df-a08a-OS00200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: name>ReadMusicContent</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint ID="8b73c253-6af7 -11 df-a08a-OS00200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSDL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:80S0NMS/ReadContent</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p: Functional ity> 
</ws-p: Interface> 
<ws-p: Interface ID="Sb 73c254-6af7 -11 df-aOSa-OS00200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Functionality Create Content Query</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p: Functionality I D="8b 73c255-6af7 -11 df-aOSa-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>CreateContentQuery</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p: Constra i nt I D =" Sb 7 3c256-6af7 -11 df -aOSa-0800200c9a66 "> 
<ws-p:ActivityLocation>WSDL </ws-p:ActivityLocation> 
<ws-
p:Location>muker.ncl.ac.uk:80S0NMS/CreateContentQuery</ws-p:Location> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Functionality> 
</ws-p:lnterface> 
</ws-p:Capability> 
Table 8. Registration data of VMS business capability 
Additionally, the VMS operator can contact the potential participants of the music 
shop (i.e. content providers). Agreements are reached between these content providers 
and the VMS operator regarding the conditions in which the business will be run and 
the VO operated. Following this, the content providers deposit their security profiles 
in the gateway together with the relevant data about their business functions (e.g. 
music catalogue web service). These security profiles contain the data necessary for 
the governance gateway to understand how to securely connect to the CPs services. 
More precisely, this means that CP3's security profile will comport a reference to the 
appropriate login XML schema. CP2's security profile on the other hand will provide 
for instance a reference to the SecP AL assertion it expects and what service, interface 
and operation the security governance gateway needs to contact in order establish 
trust and therefore allow for its identity to be established. 
Figure 46 shows the governance user interface that connects to the profile initiator 
component in order to manipulate the different elements of the exposure governance. 
In this figure, the "governance features" in the left menu allow accessing and 
modifying business capabilities, abstract and concrete profiles, contexts and context 
selectors. In the same illustration the profile used to govern the exposure in the 
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~ontext. of t?e content provid~r 3 is shown. This profile is remarkable as the 
mteractIOn wIth the content provIder 3 does not require any infrastructure the logg· 
. fi b· dd ' mg 
m rastructu:e eI~g a ed by ~he governance operator. The implemented governance, 
by conventIOn, WIll add the gIven xml nodes in the SOAP header of the request for 
which the profile is used. 
Browse 
Governance feiitures 
BUSiness capabdl1les 
Add new 
VMS 
Abstract profiles 
Add new 
apSomeMusicStore 
apRockYourWorldStore 
aplloveMyClasslcsStore 
Concrete profiles 
Add new 
cpSomeMusicStore 
cpRockYourWorldStore 
cplLoveMyClassicsSlore 
Contexts 
Add new 
cSomerJlusicStore 
cRockYourWorldStore 
ciloveMyClas51csStore 
Context selectors 
Add new 
csSomeMuslcStore 
csRockYourWorldStore 
cslLoveMyClasslcsStore 
Infrastructure capab.liues 
Add new 
ILogglng 
ISecPAlAuth 
iHTTPAuth 
Governance> Abstract profiles> plLoveMyClassicsStore 
Profile name: pIloveMyClassicsStore 0 Activated? 
<w5-p:WS-P;~fd~ ID="b6dc69~i8~7da2-4025~b47b-504e49blb68a· xmlns;w5--p~"com.bt.ws-profie"> 
<ws-p:name>CP3: I Love My OaSStCS Store</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Constraint ID="b625512a-e08d-41 09-b249-eb 171361c58c" > 
< ws-p: mise >header</ws-p: mise> 
<ws-p:value><![CDATA[ 
<cp3:auth xmlns:cp3="cp3.auth"> 
<cp3 :109ln > <Iogin-value/> </cpJ :IoQlll > 
<cp3 :pwd > <pwd-vatue/> </cp3: pwd > 
</cp3:auth> 
]]></ws-p:value> 
</ws-p:Constralnt> 
< ws-p: ServiceType [0= "ae06e340-6 763-11df-a08a -0800200c9a66" > 
< ws-p:name> logglng</ws-p: name> 
<ws-p:lnterface ID="ac06e342-6763-11df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p: Functionatity 1D=-d93e3051-676a-11df-a08a -0800200c9a66'",> 
</w5-p:lnterface> 
</ws-p: ServiceType> 
</ws-p:WS-Profile> 
Figure 46. Governance user interface and "I Love My Classics Store" profile 
The contextual data for the "I Love My Classics Store" profile is shown in Table 9. 
The configuration data specifies that for the given targeted element, particular values 
are to be changed accordingly. The targeted element in the case illustrated is the 
profile constraint shown in the "I Love My Classics Store" profile. 
<ws-c:W S-Context I D="fBO 176e4-2dfa-45c9-a36f-d 160f31B5335" xmlns:ws-c="com. bt. ws-
context"> 
<ws-c:name>cILoveMyClassicsStore</ws-c:name> 
<ws-c:configData> 
<ws-c:target>b625512a-eOBd-41 09-b249-eb171361 c5Bc</ws-c:target> 
<ws-c:misc> 
replace: 
</ws-c:misc> 
</ws-c: config Data> 
</ws-c:W S-Context> 
<login-value/>=cp3 
<pwd-value/>=pwd 
Table 9. Contextual data for "CP3: I Love My Classics Store" profile in the VMS 
Finally, the context selector allows connecting a profile, a context, a business 
capability and a routing definition. Table 1 0 shows the context selector data for the 
CP3 profile and VMS business capability. This context selector specifies that when 
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the V~S business capability sends a request containing the "ILoveMyClassicsStore" 
expresslO.n, the CP3 profile and CP3 context should be used. Additionally, the up time 
property IS set to always. 
<ws-cs:WS-ContextSelector I D "d4b4bb5e-8e31-4140-a57 c-7fb 7 d3e88edO· 
xsi:schemaLocation="com.bt.ws-context-selector context-selector.xsd" xmlns:ws-
cs="com .bt. ws-context-selector"> 
<ws-cs:name>csILoveMyClassicsStore</ws-cs:name> 
<ws-cs:profile>b6dc69d8-7 da2-4025-b4 7b-504e49b 1 b68a</ws-cs:profile> 
<ws-cs:context>f80176e4-2dfa-45c9-a36f-d160f3185335</ws-cs:context> 
<ws-cs: internalT arget>8b 73c255-6af7 -11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66</ws-
cs:internaITarget> 
<ws-cs:configSelector> 
<ws-cs:data>ILoveMyClassicsStore</ws-cs:data> 
<ws-cs:operation>request</ws-cs:operation> 
</ws-cs: configSelector> 
<ws-c:upTime> 
<ws-c:type>always</ws-c:type> 
</ws-c:upTime> 
</ws-cs:W S-ContextSelector> 
Table 10. Context selector for "CP3: I Love My Classics Store" profile and the 
"CreateContentQuery" operation of the business capability 
Table 11 holds the profile registered for CPl: Some Music Store. The content of this 
profile is shown in a more readable manner in Figure 47. The profile specifies the 
VMS business capability interaction with CPl for both request and response. From 
this profile, the governance middleware knows that the interaction requires HTTP 
digest authentication mechanism. The credentials expected are provided in the 
context. Additionally, the governance middleware learns that the content of the 
response message is "encrypted" and the method used to encrypt it. The method of 
encryption is provided in the context. 
The context and context selector for this interaction take the same form as the 
examples given in Table 9 and Table 10. 
<ws-p:WS-Profile ID="edf66321-683f-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66" xmlns:ws-p-"com.bt.ws-
profile"> 
<ws-p:name>CP1: Some Music Store profile</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Capability ID="218ee5e1-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66" xmlns:ws-
p="com. bt. ws-profile"> 
<ws-p:name>HTTP Digest Authz</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:lnterface ID="5f913a01-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Functionality</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functionality ID="639220c5-897d-4f52-8db4-
5d03456d4eab"/> 
</ws-p:I nterface> 
<ws-p:Constraint I D="Oe91 d933-f999-465b-8b80-2126b 151 c5cc"> 
<ws-p:misc>operation</ws-p:misc> 
<ws-p:value>request</ws-p:value> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Capability> 
<ws-p:Capability ID="218ee5e1-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66" xmlns:ws-
p="com.bt.ws-profile"> 
<ws-p:name>HTTP Digest Authz</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p: Interface 10 "5f913a01-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Functionality</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p:Functional ity 10="5f913a03-6836-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"/> 
</ws-p: Interface> 
<ws-p:Constraint I 0="d7 acb 7 49-eead-46dc-8ec8-d967 dce88304 "> 
<ws-p:misc>operation</ws-p :misc> 
<ws-p:value>response</ws-p:value> 
</ws-p:Constraint> 
</ws-p:Capability> 
<ws-p:ServiceType 10="ac06e340-6763-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:name>Logging</ws-p:name> 
<ws-p: I nterface I 0="ac06e342-6763-11 df-a08a-0800200c9a66"> 
<ws-p:Functional ity 10="d93e3051-676a-11 df-a08a-
0800200c9a66"/> 
</ws-p: Interface> 
</ws-p:ServiceType> 
</ws-p:WS-Profile> 
Table II. CPI Exposition profile 
Requests content with digest HTIP authent icat ion 
) 
Infrastructure Response with encrypted content 
capability ~( __________ .....:....:. ________ _ 
SomeMusicStore 
Figure 47. CPI Exposition profile 
Security profile management. At this stage it becomes poss ible for security gateway 
to validate and enact the different security profiles. 
To achieve this, the profile management component of the gateway goes through a set 
of actions that starts with the verification of the security profil e proposed to the 
definition of the processes necessary for the instantiation and management of the 
future implementation of the security profile. 
These domains can be respectively as described in secti on 3.5 split in several steps: 
defining the infrastructure capabilities, the policy templates, the service dependencies 
and the information flow for the first one and defining the profil e management 
process as well as publishing the infrastructure profile for the second. 
More details on the specific stages of the profile management and how they execute 
are given in the following paragraphs. Tests assessing the relevance and quali ty of 
these stages are found in sections 4.2.5 and 4.2.6 . 
Define security infrastructure (cf section 3.5.1): The first stage of th is process is to 
check for each security service if the description given in the security profile is 
adequate and complete according to the profile descripti on taxonomy. If that test 
passes, the abstract definition of the service as well as its requirements are gathered. 
Please note that at this stage the governance has not selected a particular instance of 
any running service but has selected the appropriate categories in the taxonomy. 
The. se~urity governanc~ gateway does separate copies of the security profile at the 
begmnmg and end of thIS process. This allows keeping a track of what the domain of 
governance requested is as opposed to the profile that will be completed and 
proposed. 
Define poli~ templates (cf. section 3.5.2): This second stage verifies if the policy 
type that wIll be used reqUIre any translation (when using different grammars). In 
addition, this stage checks how they need to be managed. In the described 
implementation this stage is not necessary. 
Define infrastructure dependencies (cf section 3.5.3): Following this individual 
check, the relationships between the services, both on the managerial and operational 
sides are verified. 
The last stage goes through the security profile and check for missing components. 
For instance, a content provider could have specified an access control method 
without mentioning any identity management. 
Following this, the VMS operator could review and select the best matches in the 
positive answers it has received, potentially eliminating content provider with too 
weak or too costly security configurations. 
Define information flow (cf section 3.5.4): With the security profile complete and 
safe, the fourth stage aims at checking how the data will flow from one operation to 
the next. In addition, the governance determines, when relevant, whether a translation 
process is necessary amongst them and/or with the content provider's security 
settings. Please note that translation mechanisms may be provided by external tools 
and are not described in the current work. Finally, the concrete services enacting the 
infrastructure capabilities are selected. 
The result of this step is saved as a security profile that can be instantiated. 
Define profile management processes (cf section 3.5.5): With the profile instance in 
place and the services selected, the final stage is for the profile composition 
management component to define the different steps that will be necessary in order to 
call, configure and connect the security services. The result of this last stage is stored 
together with the now complete and safe security profile as a coordination plan. 
When necessary the security governance gateway can then enact this complete profile 
through this management process. 
Select infrastructure profile instance (cf section 3.5.6): When required to enact a 
security profile, the gateway search into its database and selects it. It then makes sure 
that the data can flow between the enacted security profile and the VMS interactions 
they manage. 
Define service-specific policies(cf section 3.5.7): The profile management goes 
through all the concrete services selected in the security profile and instantiates the 
policy templates by inserting the context data. 
Define information flow (cf section 3.5.8): If necessary, the transformations 
templates are also instantiated according to the results of the previous step on 
translation. 
Define service exposure management processes (cf section 3.5.9): ~e profile 
manager orders and binds the different management processes of the secunty profile 
and the VMS interactions they manage. 
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Publish service ins~ance (cf section 3.5.10): Finally, the policies created in step 26 
are pushed to the dIfferent relevant stores (e.g. the SaaS capabilities driven by them) 
through the enactment of the management processes. To finish, the VMS clients of 
the CP services are bound to their instantiated profiles and exposed. 
Adaptability. A VMS will want to be able to include as many content providers as it 
can, but di~ferent pa~ners will hav.e distinct security needs and settings. By reviewing 
and ~cceptmg the dIfferent securIty profiles used by each partner according to its 
speCIfic needs, the VMS can more promptly make use of their contents. This 
necessitates and is limited by the capability of the security governance gateway to 
find security related services that provide for these different requirements. 
4.2.5. Functional tests 
In this section, the different tests done in order to evaluate if the Virtual Music Store 
functions according to expectations are presented together with their results. For each 
test, a parallel "witness test" is performed to ensure that the result is valid. 
For the purpose of testing, the VMS does not perform any caching and any query is 
directly forwarded to the Content Providers. This is possibly not an adequate practice 
for this type of system in a commercial environment, but renders the testing easier. 
Test 1: Content Provider 1 integration. For this first test, all the infrastructure 
capabilities are registered in the governance gateway. However, only the first 
exposition profile is made available. If the gateway is well implemented, the 
infrastructures and profile description well written, this test is expected to pass. 
Validation test. In order to insure that test 1 result is valid, in this validation stage, the 
logging infrastructure capability is unregistered. As it has been marked as a 
mandatory infrastructure in all profiles, this test is expected to fail. 
Test 2: Content Provider 2 integration. For this second test, all the infrastructure 
capabilities are registered in the governance gateway. However, only the second 
exposition profile is made available. If the gateway is well implemented, the 
infrastructures and profile description well written, this test is expected to pass. 
Validation test: In order to verify test 2 result, the Functionality Token interface is 
erased from the SecP AL Authz infrastructure description. As this renders the SecP AL 
Authz infrastructure unsuitable for the contextualisation this test is expected to fail. 
Test 3: Content Provider 3 integration. For this third test, all the infrastructure 
capabilities are registered in the governance gateway. However, only the third 
exposition profile is made available. If the gateway is well implemented, the 
infrastructures and profile description well written, this test is expected to pass. 
Validation test: In this validation test, the schema defining user credentials supported 
by the custom authorization infrastructure used by CP3 is modified (usemame node is 
changed to user). This test is expected to fail. 
Test 4: All Content Provider integration. For this fourth test, all the infrastructure 
capabilities are registered in the governance gateway. In addition, all the exposition 
profiles are made available. If the gateway is well implemented, the infrastructures 
and profile descriptions well written, this test is expected to pass. 
Validation test: In this validation test, the HTTP digest infrastructure capability is 
unregistered. The expected outcome of this test is that only content coming from 
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content providers 2 and 3 wi ll appear on the VMS interface and therefore the te twill 
fail. 
Table 12 shows the results of the tests. The result is set as passed \ hen the adequat 
music tracks per content provider are displayed on the web interface and failed 
otherwise. As all the tests produce the expected outcomes, the exposition go ernance 
implementation is therefore validated from a functional point of iew. 
Figure 48 and Figure 49 illustrate the outcomes of test 1 and its alidation 
counterpart. 
.!MUSiC 
Browse 
GeOl'es 
Cool .Jazz 
Europe an Jazz 
.Jazz Fu s ion 
Latin .Jazz 
Orcrl8stral ,Jazz 
Smoot!'I,Jazz 
Browse 
Genres 
Cool,lazz 
European Jazz 
Jazz Fu sion 
Latin Jazz 
Orclle stral Jazz 
Smooth Jazz 
Figure 48. Test 1 result 
Music 
• 'Round /I,bout MlrJrllqrlt - Miles DaVIS 
Provi der: Some MUSIC Stale 
• The LegendalY Plestlqe Glulntet Sessions - Miles Davis 
Provider: Some MUSIC Stale 
Figure 49. Test t va lidation test result 
Music 
Test ResuJt Expected 
result 
1 Passed Passed 
1 validation Failed Failed 
2 Passed Passed 
2 validation Failed Failed 
3 Passed Passed 
3 va lidation Failed Fa iled 
4 Passed Pa ed 
4 validation Failed Failed 
Table 12. I mplementation tests r esults 
4.2.6.Adaptability tests 
The purpose of thi s evaluation is to demonstrate the adaptabi li ty of the ecuri ty 
governance middleware. In order to do so, th e auth or has asses ed its capacity for 
integration with different systems and the capacity to manage thi s adaptabi lity when 
dealing with different types of unava il ability, change or event. 
Communications between the VMS and the security govern ance so lution are ecured 
using the VMS security settings. The security of thi s type of middleware i a umed 
to be equiva lent to that of th e security profiles it enac ts. Indeed, th e me age 
exchanges between the different components of the middleware are ecured a we ll as 
the exchanges with external services as provided by the external ervice. External 
security services that are used to provide security requirement are trusted . For each 
test, a parallel "witness test" is performed to ensure that the result i va lid . 
Adaptability to external factors 
Test 1: Infrastructure capability change. This test is simi lar to ' test 3: Content 
Provider 3 integration validation test". In order to demonstrate that the governance 
middleware is capable to adapt to changes in the way the external infrastructure 
capabilities behave, this earlier test was repeated. Once again, this test is expected to 
fail. 
Validation test. In order to insure that test 1 result is valid, in this validation stage, the 
custom authorization infrastructure used by CP3 is registered twice. The fust 
registration makes use of the unmodified and valid node while the second one is 
registered with the modified node as in the earlier test. This test is expected to pass. 
Test 2: Introduction of new infrastructure capability. To ensure that the 
introduction of new infrastructure capabilities is supported and does not hamper the 
good functioning of the governance middleware, the same type of infrastructure is 
deployed and registered several times . In thi s case the custom authorization 
infrastructure used by CP3 is deployed and registered three times. Thi test i 
expected to pass . 
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Validation test. In order to insure that aforementioned test's result is valid, h 
. d h· eac 
reglstere custom aut onzation infrastructure was in turn unregistered until none was 
left. The first two tests are expected to pass while the third iteration leaves 
authorization service for CP3 is expected to fail. no 
!est 3: Change a profile. In this test, the mandatory logging infrastructure capability 
IS taken out of the abstract profile and is therefore not required anymore. This test is 
expected to pass. 
!"alidation test. In this va1idatio~ test, the logging infrastructure capability is put back 
III the abstract profile but unregIstered from the service registry. This test is expected 
to fail. 
Test 4: Change a security policy In this test, the values of the username and 
password are modified in the profile description and at CP3 's side authorization code. 
This test is expected to pass. 
Validation test. To verify the validity of the previous test, CP3 's side authorization 
code is changed back to allow only the previous values to be accepted. This test is 
expected to fail. 
Adaptability to internal factors 
Test 5: Swap a security component for another, similar, component. This test is 
similar to "Test 2: Introduction of new infrastructure capability". However, the HTTP 
digest infrastructure capability was used instead of the custom authorization 
infrastructure. This test is expected to pass. 
Validation test. As for "Test 2: Introduction of new infrastructure capability" 
validation test. The first two iterations are expected to pass while the third iteration 
leaves no authorization service for CP 1 is expected to fail. 
Reusability 
Test 6: Use an infrastructure capability in different profiles. With the presence of 
the logging infrastructure capability in the abstract profile and the use of the abstract 
profile as the base for all security profiles, this test has been performed through 
previous tests. This test is expected to pass. 
Validation test. In order to demonstrate that the governance middleware tolerates the 
presence of a registered but unused infrastructure, the logging infrastructure was taken 
out of the abstract profile, but still registered in the service registry. This test is 
expected to pass. 
Test 7: Reuse stored profile in a different context. An abstract profile has been 
used, in order to define minimum requirements, as the base for all security profiles. 
This test has therefore been performed through previous tests. This test is expected to 
pass. 
Validation test. In this scenario, the use of the abstract profile was made mandatory in 
order to guaranty a minimum security. However, in different scenarios, this might not 
be the case and it is trivial to deduce from the previous tests that this possibility, when 
implemented can be supported by a governance middleware. 
Table 13 shows the results of the adaptability tests. The result is set as passed when 
the adequate music tracks per content provider are displayed on the web interface and 
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failed otherwise. As all the tests produce the expected outcomes th .. 
. " e expo ItlOn 
governance ImplementatIOn IS therefore validated from a functional point of le\ . 
Test 
Result Expected 
result 
1 Failed Failed 
1 validation Passed Passed 
2 Passed Pas ed 
2 validation Passed , Passed, Passed, Passed, 
Failed Failed 
3 Passed Pa ed 
3 validation Failed Failed 
4 Passed Pas ed 
4 validation Failed Failed 
5 Passed Passed 
5 validation Passed, Passed, Passed, Passed, 
Failed Failed 
6 Passed Passed 
6 validation Passed Pa sed 
7 Passed Pa ed 
7 validation / / 
Table 13. Adaptability tests results 
The potential scope of the contextualisation governance is wide and the concrete 
architecture has been thought of to take into account complex scenarios as well as 
simple ones. The tests presented in this section do not cover all aspects possible as 
this would necessitate more effort than it is possible in the tirneframe of thi s thesis. 
Instead, the tests showed a practical illustration of the possibilities made available by 
the use of a well-defined contextualisation governance architecture. 
4. 1. Discussion 
The authors of [42] (cf. related work section 2.2.2), have devised six types of 
adaptation that a flexible security middleware suite should support : 
Sl Change a local parameter of a security component (e.g. the encryption method for 
an audit service). 
S2 Introduce new security functionality (e.g. add a secure logging component). 
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S3 Compose/reco~po~e a deployed security component with one or more application 
comp~nents. ApphcatIOn components depend on the security component but the 
secunty component can also depend on the application component(s) (e.g. for 
context-based access control). 
S4 Swap a security component for another one (e.g. replace the authorization decision 
engine). 
S5 Compose a security component using a (new) third-party component that is 
deployed elsewhere. 
S6 Change a security policy. Since the security policy explicitly depends on 
application-level concepts, any change in a security policy can require further 
adaptations. 
The system proposed in this paper, based on the security profile, is meant to introduce 
flexibility to the way in which the NFP aggregation lifecyc1e is managed and user 
requirements expressed. Therefore the following discussion points have been added: 
S7 Enact the security profile at different stages in different situations (e.g. CP I steps 
1-39, CP2 steps 21-39). 
S8 Express identical requirements using different semantics. 
The objective of this discussion is to review the adaptability and to define its limits. 
The security profiles submitted by the content provider to the security governance 
middleware have been used in order to determine the scope of the adaptation. 
SI Changing a security service's configuration requires the user to change the security 
profile. With the change committed, the governance middleware will make use of 
Service Management's access to the security service's management interface to 
perform the change. However, the governance infrastructure will go through the 
process of profile management to ensure that the change is valid and can be realized. 
If the security service does not support this change a different one may be selected or 
the modification rejected. 
S2 If the relevant security services are registered as accessible in this context and with 
these requirements, a security profile needs to be updated with the additional security 
functionality. 
S3 Composition of security as well as other value-adding services can be realized. Of 
course, the quality of the segregation of a security service between different contexts 
(e.g. different interactions and conversations) depends on its implementation and may 
not be possible. For instance, a service mayor may not support multi-domain 
instantiations and configurations. 
S4 As presented in section 3.5, replacing a security service with another, similar one 
is achievable as long as a potential replacement is registered and accessible. If a 
security service is found missing at runtime, it is possible to start again from step 13 
onwards, to regenerate an instantiated profile while storing the incoming and outgoing 
messages. 
S5 The ability to compose external providers' security services is the very foundation 
of this work. 
S6 In this model, modifying a security policy is equivalent to changing a security 
component local parameter (c.f. SI). This is due to the expected policy driven nature 
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of the infrastructure capabilities. A component local parameter will be modified using 
policy, in the same technical manner as an access control assertion (i.e. security 
policy). 
87 It is possible to store a profile's state at any stage of its lifecyc1e. Howeyer, 
validation stages are required in most cases to ensure the profile's validity at the time 
of use (e.g. whether the security service is still available). 
88 This point has not been verified in this set of experiments. However, it depends on 
the different semantic styles used as well as their interoperability. 
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5. Summary of contributions and future ,york 
In the previous section, an implementation of the proposed concrete architecture was 
presented. Subsequently, series of tests bo~h functional and targeting the adaptability 
~ere ~resented to demonstrate the valIdity of the implementation. Finally, a 
dIScussIon based on the evaluation of a similar approach was proposed. 
In this chapter the author summarises the contributions of the work and then 
concludes the thesis with suggestions for future work. 
5.1. Summary of research challenges 
In the following paragraphs, the author assesses the proposed approach with respect to 
each of the research challenge provided in Chapter 2. 
1. Reusability of integration layer. The separation of concerns in the architecture 
proposed (c.f. Figure 17, Figure 23, Figure 31) aims at providing a coarse-grained 
distribution of the components. In this architecture the level of granularity proposed 
answers to the levels or reutilisation and potential performance optimisation 
techniques (e.g. replication) that can be used in distributed systems. In addition the 
message broker nature of the approach proposed offers a high potential for reusability. 
2. Shared communication semantics. This requirement is principally dealt with by 
the brokering nature of the architecture proposed and the service orientation that 
brings ease of connectivity. 
3. Decentralised model. The separation of concern and service orientation of the 
architecture allows avoiding a central core and relying on distributed components. 
The use of dedicated layers to administrate policies (c.f. policy management core 
infrastructure in section 3 A.l) and potential components (c.f. service management 
core infrastructure in section 3A.l) permits the architecture to be flexible when 
dealing with resource location. 
4. Definition of SOA governance and related concepts. The core objectives of the 
proposed architecture are presented in section 1 and further developed through a 
practical example in section 1.1. 
5. High level description of key contextualisation elements and concepts. Sections 
3.2 and 3.3 present the different elements forming the governance architecture and 
their relationships. Each element is described individually before a more global 
definition where the components are presented together is proposed. 
6. Technical description of key contextualisation elements and their 
relationships. In addition to the descriptions as mentioned in point 5, sections 3A and 
3.5 give a more detailed description of the key elements and a point by point 
description of all the steps happening prior and during a contextualisation. These steps 
are further divided into actions to give further details on the different processes taking 
place. 
7. Non Functional Property (NFP) description model. With the use of the 
infrastructure profile definition proposed in section 3.3.1, potential partners (e.g. end 
users, other governance middleware, NFP providers) and this current architecture are 
able to express requirements in term ofNFP and communicate them. 
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8. NFP profile description. The infrastructure profile along with the mechanisms that 
allow selecting ~apabilities and their policies are described in Chapter 3 on the 
anatomy of the mf~astructure. The grammar used to describe the profile can be 
adapted to fit specIfic needs. The selection of capabilities and policies are also 
handled by dedicated layers enabling flexible and adaptable mechanisms. 
9. NFP profile instance. The stages described in the series of steps necessary in order 
to create a safe and complete profile and then instantiate it as well as expose the 
business capabilities are described in section 3.5. The policy driven approach used in 
the architecture presented along with a dedicated layer for service management (c.f. 
section 3.4.2.1 on Capability management) allow specific management processes and 
policies to efficiently specify and supervise the characteristics of the infrastructures 
and profiles life-cycle. For the profile, these life cycles management processes are 
used by a dedicated component (i.e. Profile Life-Cycle Management in Figure 31). 
Finally the process of instantiating the profile and its different components (e.g. 
services, policies) allows multi-tenancy usage scenarios. 
10. Reusable & manageable NFP providers. The choice of service based 
architecture was partly to be able to rely upon distributed pieces of software that can 
be made configurable and reusable. As presented in point 9 above, the architecture 
comprises a dedicated layer management to manage the different components and 
allow for their optimal reusability. This in tum, allows for the governance to 
interchange and reconfigure the different capabilities taking part in the governance 
process. 
11. Run time aggregation of NFPs. The stages described in the series of steps 
necessary in order to create a safe and complete profile and then instantiate it as well 
as expose the business capabilities (c.f. section 3.5) present such policy schemes and 
how they can be contextualised. The transformation mechanism relies on three 
elements, the policy template, the transformation policy and the contextualised data. 
The first two elements are provided at design time while the later is given at run time. 
This system is flexible but becomes more and more complex as the number of 
transformation potentially necessary increase. 
12. Domain agnostic. The limitations of the architecture proposed in terms of the 
types of resources it can govern and the categories of contextualisation it can provide 
are limited by the NFP description models it holds and the NFP providing 
components (i.e. infrastructure capabilities) it is aware of. 
13. Life-cycle management of the aggregation of NFPs. The stages described in the 
series of steps necessary in order to create a safe and complete profile and then 
instantiate it as well as expose the business capabilities are described in section 3.5. 
These stages are progressing from an abstract profile with a high level view of what 
the domain of exposition will be into an instantiated and enacted profile that is 
complete and comprises concrete as well as configured instance of services. 
14. Semantically described components. A normalised manner is used to define the 
way infrastructure capabilities are exposed. This taxonomy is described in Figure 19 
of section 3.3.l. 
15. Semantic agnostic. The proposed architecture can be made to understand 
different manners to express the domain of exposition thanks to the user interface 
abstract service pattern used (c.f. section 3.4.2) and the policy driven approach of the 
architecture. The limitation to this approach being that a translation between a new 
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semantic and an existing one, understood by the governance middleware. must be 
provided. 
16. Support for end to end message level security. By maintaining no visible link 
between the final enhanced exposed resource and its pre-governance source (i.e. the 
business capability), the architecture, within the scope of its contextualisation, 
prevents threats from reaching the resource directly (c.f. steps 23 and 38 of the 
business capability exposure in section 3.5). In addition, the state of the different 
resources (e.g. NFP providers, policies) can be constantly monitored to prevent an 
unwanted execution of a profile. Finally, in order to prevent information leaks, 
security and auditing capabilities such as a logging service (c.f. section 4.2), when 
available, can be seamlessly included in the profile to evaluate data miss-management 
or prevent privacy issue. A tested scenario covering such requirement is described in 
the evaluation section (c.f. section 4). 
17. Verify validity of the contextualisation strategy. During the profile life-cycle, 
dependencies are systematically sought and resolved. In addition, the profile usability 
can be enhanced for particular environments using different ways to express the 
exposition requirements through the user interface abstract service pattern (c.f. section 
3.4.2). 
Table 14. Summary of research challenges 
Legend 
L - supported 
X - supported 
2 and specified 1 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
in detail 
"" -not 
supported 
Proposed 
concrete X X X X X L X L X L X X X X X X 
architecture 
Table 14 recapitulates the research challenges in the same manner as Table 1, Table 2, 
Table 3 and Table 4, but specifying what points are fulfilled by the proposed concrete 
architecture as opposed to those satisfied by the related works. 
5.2. SOA governance model and Service 
Delivery Frameworks 
This section focuses on the framework's conformance to the principles of the standard 
Service Delivery Framework developed by the TeleManagement Forum, introduced 
in section 2.2.3 and more thoroughly described in [44]. 
Figure 50 presents the main SDF concepts overlaid by those of governance model, 
showing the detailed mapping of the proposed governance model on top of the 
standard framework. 
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Figure 50. Mapping the Governance Model on the OF tandard 
The governance model presented in the prev ious section has been de eloped in full 
compliance with the SDF standard of the TMF. This alignment extend the 
applicability of the governance model in service domains that conform to DF and 
fulfils the respective research challenges 5 and 6 introduced in ection 2.2.4 . 
The functional interface of the SDF in this mapping is the governance manageme nt 
interface as it is the governance model interface that allows for the management of 
capability. 
The management service consists of the different component de cribed in ection 
3.4. Specifically these are the Profile management, Capabili ty management and the 
governance layer base which allows cementing and managing the governance 
enabling infrastructures . 
The infrastructure support services are these governance enabling infra tructures that 
allow for the governance model to run along with the potential in frastructure 
capabilities that can be used to provide non functional support. 
The SDF Infrastructure may host further supporting facilities for the remaining 
governance model aspects. It can provide Policy-based Management facilities in order 
to handle service policies and rules, as specified in the governance model description . 
It can also use the service catalogue to capture dependencies of a service onto other 
component artefacts. Finally, it can offer authentication and authorisation mechani sms 
for access control in order to define and assign privileges regarding the scope of 
operations entities can conduct within the SDF or capabilities they bear and can make 
avai lable to SDF. 
5.3. General summary 
In this thesis , the author has provided a description of an architecture for contextual 
governance for SOA. This model is based on requirements that underline the need for 
policy and process management, resource life-cycle management i ibilit and 
contextualisation. One of the roles and tested u e case of the propo ed model i to 
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handle th~ security of web services exposed through it by managing their e unry 
configuratlOn. 
The chapter 1 identifies the domain for action as managing tbe conte tuali arion of a 
:esourc~ in a SOA in. ~ flexible manner. This creates the need to upport the 
mtegratlOn and cOmpOSltIon of as many infrastructures allowing the enhancement of 
the exposure as well as the life cycle of tbe exposure thus created. dditionally. the 
enhancement of the exposure must be made safe and secured. To thi end. the auth r 
proposed a model for governing the different aspects of tbe exposure. Till mod I 
describes a set of middleware services along witb tbeir interaction and an 
infrastructure composition structure called profile. The core of the work in thi the i 
compnses: 
1. A set of requirements that define what is needed in order to e tabli h th 
governance of a service exposure. 
2 . A description of the architecture that fulfil these requirement . 
3. An implementation of thi s model along with an e aluation again t the 
requirements aforementioned. 
This work addresses the requirements for contextua li ation go ernance peci fled in 
Section 2.2.4. 
A notable feature of the author 's approach is a careful sepa ration of concern and 
modulari ty of the architecture. Figure 51 recall s the architecture presented in ect ion 
and presents a layered view of it. 
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Figure 51. Layered view of the governance arch itecture 
The contextualisation governance is realised through a set of middleware that allow 
enhancing the exposition of resources by composing external FP in£r~structures ~nd 
managing the composition. This set of middleware is itself separated 1D four logical 
layers: the external capabi lities that encompass both the business and in~~s~c~re 
capabilities, the management layer that comprises core infrastructure capabilltle . :-V.lth 
supervision roles , the operational layer which includes the functional core capabilltl.e 
such as event processing, reposi tories and registries and finally the dat~ and ecun~y 
layers allowing to describe the components and secure the architecture. Thl 
separation is fundamental to the flexibility of the middleware. 
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In these layers, each of these capabilities can be deployed as a components with its 
?wn management, policy administration framework (control pane) and operational 
Interfaces (data pane). Each capability is also policy driven as this permits 
configurability and flexibility. The different capabilities are meant to have their own 
distinct grammars and policy languages in order to keep their own advantages, 
capacities and evolution potential in their respective domains. 
The interoperability issues generated by this situation are addressed at the messaging 
level through transformation and governance as demonstrated by the transformation 
steps (section 3.5.2 point 7). 
This also enables the interchange of core capabilities within their categories when 
necessary. Non-core capabilities (e.g. auditing) can also be added through the same 
manner. 
It is noticeable that choosing to have these components to be independent and follow 
their own path implies an additional level of complexity. However this trade-off is 
compensated by the gains in flexibility, dynamicity and by allowing auditing of the 
results of each action separately if necessary. 
The author has demonstrated the novelty of the design and implementation of the 
contextualisation governance middleware with respect to the related work discussed 
in chapter 2. Novel contributions include: 
(i) the development of a flexible SOA based architecture that is based on 
fundamental work on distributed systems flexibility, 
(ii) the provision of systematic support for exposure governance that is 
adaptable to different application contexts, 
(iii) the implementation of a governance middleware in order to secure the 
exposure of resources in the shared domain. 
In summary, as proposed in the introduction, through a SOA based architecture for 
distributed resource contextualisation governance, the author has established that: 
1. A set of middleware services can provide an efficient support 
for flexible resource contextualisation governance. 
2. This enhanced flexible contextualisation can be organised in 
such a manner that it preserves the safety of the exchanges. 
Annex 4 lists the published work related to the architecture described in this thesis. 
The following section will present a discussion of potential future works that continue 
the theme of exploring fundamental concepts in the context of realistic systems 
implementation. 
5.4. Future work 
The current state of this work defines a concrete architecture for governance of safe 
and flexible contextualisation of resources in a SOA. Future investigation could 
evolve the material and expand on a variety of relevant topics. The following are 
some possible areas. 
5.4.1. Different use cases 
Potential future works include the use of governance middleware in different types of 
scenarios. Following is a list of potential use cases considered by the author: 
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• 
• 
The Product and Service Assembly (PSA initiative) Catalyst [85], relies 
on a set of catalogues grouped in an infrastructure named the Active 
Catalog. One potential future research would be to investigate the place 
of such complex registry in the governance architecture or alternatively 
how the PSA initiative could take advantage of the architecture 
presented in this thesis. 
The Internet of Things and Service (loTS) could be another environment 
where the governance architecture presented could play an interesting 
role. In [86] the co-authors and I identify the interest of security 
governance in the loTS where Things could learn of potential threats and 
how to deal with them from other governed Things. Scenarios in Service 
Oriented Manufacturing chains are currently being discussed. 
5.4.2. Flexible 501 governance 
The investigation currently undertaken by the author and following this work 
comprises the study of this architecture in the context of flexible Service Oriented 
Infrastructure (SOl). 
SOl provides a system for supplying information technology infrastructure as a 
service. Key aspects of SOl include virtualisation of all configurable infrastructure 
resources such as compute, storage, and networking hardware and software to support 
the running of applications. Consistent with the objectives for SOA, SOl facilitates 
the reuse and dynamic allocation of necessary infrastructure resources [53). 
The main objective of this investigation is to determine how it would be possible to 
provide support to end users of SOl through a high level dashboard providing user 
centric semantics. Through this user centric layer, levels of NFPs and preferences 
(e.g. performance, security) could be chosen and selected. These preferences would 
then create sets of rules (i.e. profile in section 3.3.1) that would govern the SOl 
through monitoring, dynamic selection of infrastructures and virtualisation. 
5.4.3. Improved profile expression 
In section 2.2, the author has established that investigating the semantics necessary to 
describe IT system requirements is a legitimate and complex research topic on its 
own. One potential topic for future work is to utilise the requirements presented in 
paragraphs 2 on background in order to provide a more comprehensive and useable 
profile description model. 
Alternatively, future work could explore how different semantics used to describe 
such requirements in different domains could be taken into account and used by 
governance middleware. 
5.4.4. Federated governance 
In section 3.6.2 on deployment patterns, the federation of governance middleware is 
introduced. The study of such use of governance middleware could attempt to 
determine a) what are the processes and techniques necessary in order to achieve 
efficient federation and b) what are the different types of federation achievable (e.g. 1 
master with dependant governance middleware, equally ranked) and c) in what 
context it would interesting to use them. In such environments it would then be 
possible to investigate the potential of negotiating properties of the governance. 
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5.4.5. Trust brokering 
In the context of governed interactions, service providers could find themselves in a 
situation where they do not know what services and by extension which providers are 
catering for different properties of the exchanges (e.g. security in the security 
governance scenario in section 4.2). This presents the governance architecture with 
the issue of allowing the different potential participants to express how they would 
define the level of trust required for entities in order to enter in collaboration with 
them. The following are some of the challenges of trust brokering in this type 
environment: 
• Allowing a coarse grained definition of the level of trust required: a participant 
should be permitted to express what it expects from each property of the 
interaction (e.g. identity management, access control, virtualisation). 
Additionally, the participant should also be able to specify the level of trust 
required to access certain types of data in the interaction. 
• Dynamic trust allocation: in this type of rapidly evolving environment, a 
participant's life-span can be very short. How to define how trustable this 
entity is when it has never been part of any collaboration and is potentially 
unknown to all participants should be taken into account. 
• Properties and enforcement of trust: with potentially many different actors 
covering diverse aspects of a collaboration, defining what trust is and how it 
should be enforced could also become a challenge and should therefore be 
examined. 
5.4.6. SOA governance middleware performance 
improvement 
In the SOA security governance middleware presented in section 4, policy templates, 
instances and processes are exchanged over the network. In complex scenarios or 
environments where the network is critical, this could create a stress on the physical 
infrastructure and the core infrastructure capabilities used as the more complex the 
profile, the more such data need to be exchanged. 
One possible future research direction would be to investigate a) potential techniques 
that could be used to reduce the amount of data necessary to exchange or b) the 
number and types of the exchanges themselves between the core infrastructure 
capabilities of the architecture while keeping the level of distribution as high as 
possible. 
5.4.7.Monitoring and Auditing 
In chapters 3 and 5, the author introduces the relevance and possibility of introducing 
elements of monitoring and auditing into the architecture. These elements could 
further enhance the safety and reactivity of the architecture and allow further 
investigations towards autonomous behaviours. Due to the loosely coupled and 
distributed nature of the model, introducing such capabilities could be made on the 
top of the architecture proposed. 
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Appendix 
1. Profile description XML schema 
<?xml version "1.0" encoding-"UTF-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs= .. http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema .. xmlns:ws-p="com.bt.ws-profile" 
targetNamespace="com.bt.ws-profile" elementFormDefault="qualified" 
attributeFormDefault="unqualified"> 
<xs:element name='WS-Profile" type="ws-p:tProfile"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>Schema for WS-Profile</xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Constraint" type="ws-p:tConstraint"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>Schema for WS-Profile</xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:complexType name="tProfile"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>tProfile is the top level node of a WS-Profile. It 
contains all the information expressed or required. </xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="ServiceType" type="ws-p:tServiceType" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element name="Constraint" type="ws-p:tConstraint" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element name="CoordinationPlan" type="ws-p:tProfile" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attribute name="ID" type="ws-p:tUUID"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:element name="Capability" type="ws-p:tServiceType"/> 
<xs:com plexType name="tService Type"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>tServiceType is the top level of abstraction for an 
activity in the WS-Profile. </xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
<xs:complexContent> 
<xs:extension base="ws-p:tActivity"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="lnterface" type="ws-p:tlnterface" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:extension> 
</xs:complexContent> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tlnterface"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>tlnterface may allow to differentiate different 
parts of the same activity in the WS-Profile. For instance, one activity could have both 
management and operational interfaces. </xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
<xs:com plexContent> 
<xs:extension base="ws-p:tActivity"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="Functionality" t:YQ.e="ws-
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p:tFunctionality" minOccurs-"O" maxOccurs-"unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:extension> 
</xs :com plexContent> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tFunctionality"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>tFunctionality may allow to differentiate different 
functions of the same interface in the WS-Profile. For instance, one interface could allow to 
manage users and items, these would be two different functionalities. </xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
<xs:complexContent> 
<xs:extension base="ws-p:tActivity"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="Operation" type="ws-
p:tOperation" minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:extension> 
</xs:complexContent> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tOperation"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>tOperation links to the concrete operations of a 
functionality in the WS-Profile. For instance, one user management functionality could have 
operations about deleted, updating or creating users.</xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
<xs:complexContent> 
<xs:extension base="ws-p:tActivity"> 
<xs:sequence/> 
</xs:extension> 
</xs:complexContent> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tConstraint"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>tConstraint allows connecting constraints to the 
different levels of abstraction in the WS-Profile. For instance, an operation could require 
another one to called immediatly before in order to work.</xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
<xs:choice> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="PolicyType" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="Location" type="xs:string"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="BeforeorAfter"> 
<xs:simple Type> 
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> 
<xs:enumeration value="before"/> 
<xs:enumeration value="after"/> 
</xs:restriction> 
</xs:simpleType> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:element name="Activity" type="xs:string"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="ActivityLocation" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="Location" type="xs:string"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="misc" type="xs:string"/> 
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<xs:element name=ftvalueft type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="Constraintft type="ws-p:tConstraint" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:choice> 
<xs:attribute name="IO" type="ws-p:tUUIO"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tActivity"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation> T Activity defines an abstract component of the 
Policy. </xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="Constraint" type="ws-p:tConstraint" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attribute name="IO" type="ws-p:tUUIO"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:simpleType name="tUUIO"> 
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> 
<xs:pattern value="[a-fO-9]{8}-[a-fO-9]{4}-[a-fO-9]{4}-[a-fO-9]{4}-[a-fO-
9]{12}"/> 
</xs: restriction> 
</xs:simpleType> 
</xs:schema> 
Table 15. WS-Profile XML Schema 
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2. Context description XML schema 
<?xml version-"1.0" encoding-"UTF-S"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs= .. http://www.w3.org/2001IXMLSchema .. xmlns:ws_c="com.bl.ws_ 
context" targetNamespace="com.bt.ws-context" elementFormOefault="qualified" 
attributeFormOefault="unqualified"> 
<xs:element name='WS-Context" type="ws-c:tContext"> 
<xs:annotation> 
<xs:documentation>Schema for WS-Context</xs:documentation> 
</xs:annotation> 
</xs:element> 
<xs:complexType name="tContext"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="configOata" type="ws-c:tConfigOata" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attribute name="IO" type="ws-c:tUUIO"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tConfigOata"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="target" type="ws-c:tUUIO"/> 
<xs:element name="data" type="ws-c:tUUIO" minOccurs="O" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
<xs:element name="misc" type="xs:anyType" minOccurs="O" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attribute name="IO" type="ws-c:tUUIO"/> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:simpleType name="tUUIO"> 
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> 
<xs:pattern value="[a-fD-9]{S}-[a-fD-9]{4}-[a-fD-9]{4}-[a-fD-9]{4}-[a-fD-
9]{12}"/> 
</xs:restriction> 
</xs:simpleType> 
</xs:schema> 
Table 16. WS-Context XML Schema 
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3. Context Selector description XML schema 
<?xml version-"1.0" encoding-"UTF-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs= .. http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema .. xmlns:ws-cs="com.bt.ws_ 
context-selector" targetN a mespace=" com. bt. ws-context-selector" 
elementFormOefault="qualified" attributeFormOefault="unqualified"> 
<xs:element name='WS-ContextSelector" type="ws-cs:tContextSelector"l> 
<xs:complexType name="tContextSelector"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"l> 
<xs:element name="profile" type="ws-cs:tUUIO" minOccurs="1" 
maxOccurs="unbou nded"l> 
<xs:element name="context" type="ws-cs:tUUIO" minOccurs="1" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"l> 
<xs:element name="internaITarget" type="ws-cs:tUUIO"I> 
<xs:element name="upTime" type="ws-cs:tValidity" minOccurs="1" 
maxOccurs="1 "1> 
<xs:element name="configSelector" type="ws-cs:tSelector" 
minOccurs="1" maxOccurs="unbounded"l> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attribute name="IO" type="ws-cs:tUUIO"I> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tValidity"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="type" type="ws-cs:tPeriod" minOccurs="O" 
maxOccurs="1 "1> 
<xs:element name="when" type="ws-cs:tOateAndLength" 
minOccurs="O" maxOccurs="unbounded"l> 
</xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:simpleType name="tPeriod"> 
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> 
<xs:enumeration value="always"l> 
<xs:enumeration value="on-request"l> 
<xs:enumeration value="time-frame"l> 
</xs:restriction> 
</xs:simpleType> 
<xs:complexType name="tDateAndLength"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="startdate" type="xs:dateTime" maxOccurs="1 "I> 
<xs:element name="period" type="xs:duration" maxOccurs="1"1> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attribute name="IO" type="ws-cs:tUUIO"I> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:complexType name="tSelector"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="target" type="ws-cs:tUUIO"I> 
<xs:element name="data" type="xs:string"/> 
<xs:element name="operation" type="ws-cs:tOperation"l> 
</xs:sequence> 
<xs:attribute name="IO" type="ws-cs:tUUIO"I> 
</xs:complexType> 
<xs:simpleType name="tOperation"> 
<xs:restriction base="xs:string"> 
<xs:enumeration value="request"l> 
<xs:enumeration value="response"l> 
<xs:enumeration value="both"l> 
</xs: restriction> 
</xs:simpleType> 
<xs:simpleType name-"tUUIO"> 
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<xs:restriction base-"xs:string"> 
9]{12}"/> 
<xs:patlern value="[a-fO-9]{8}-[a-fO-9]{4}-[a-fO-9]{4}-[a-fO-9]{4}-[a_fO_ 
</xs: restriction> 
</xs:simpleType> 
</xs:schema> 
Table 17. WS-ContextSelector XML Schema 
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